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THOMAS ALLEN MOONt

WILLIAM

I.

D. MOONt

THE PROPERTY TAX AND GOVERNMENT SERVICES
IN PERSPECTIVE

A.

Introduction

R ECENTLY, the federal courts have been called upon to determine
how state and local governments may distribute the services they
perform. Three of these cases' have focused on inequities in services
supported primarily through the local property tax. The popular press2
is replete with stories of taxpayer discontent with sharply rising property taxes and static or declining levels of services. This incongruity t Member of the Texas Bar. B.A., Texas Christian University, 1964, M.A.,
1973; J.D., University of Texas, 1971.
t Member of the Texas Bar. B.A., Texas Christian University, 1969; J.D.,
University of Texas, 1971.
The authors wish to acknowledge the thoughtful advice and criticism of
James F. Parker of the Texas Bar and Richard N. Weinstein of the New York Bar.
1. Hawkins v. Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1970), held that municipal corporations must provide municipal services equally to all citizens; Rodriguez v. San
Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1972), rev'd, 93
S. Ct. 1278 (1973), and Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal.

Rptr. 601 (1971), both initially holding education to be a "fundamental interest"
have, in light of the recent Supreme Court decision, been overruled, at least as a
matter of federal constitutional requirements.
2. Two recent articles, in particular, point out the futility sensed by many at
the continuing problem of high taxes and poor services at the state and local level.
One predicted that governmental spending by state and local governments throughout
the United States will continue to increase for the foreseeable future with a resulting
increase in pressure on property owners. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 7, 1971,
at 59-61. The other, an Associated Press story, described the uneven growth rates and
unequal property tax burdens, with resulting disparities in the level and quality of

public services, among the different communities comprising the major metropolitan
areas of the country. Austin Statesman, June 28, 1972, at 84, col. 1. These articles
illustrate the intensity of the property tax burden, the unequal availability of local
services, and the inequity of some local tax burdens as compared with others. In
light of these facts, both articles express resignation about the continuation of these
trends and the failure of our institutions to cope with them.

(527)
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rising taxes and declining services - prompted President Nixon to
submit a revenue sharing program intended to alleviate the growing
squeeze on local taxpayers. In his revenue sharing message, he stated:
Nearly three-fourths of their [state and local governments'] tax
revenues come from property and sales taxes, which are slow to
reflect economic expansion. It is estimated, in fact, that the
natural growth in revenues from these sources lags some 40 to
50 per cent behind the growth rate for State and local expenditures.
This means that budget expansion at these levels must be financed
primarily through new taxes and through frequent increases in
existing tax rates.3
The attention of the courts thus far has been directed primarily to
disparities in the levels of services and only incidentally to the method
by which these services are financed. This emphasis upon the property
tax is important because it is the largest single source of revenue at
the local governmental level.4
Although utilization of the property tax in Texas will be the
focal point of this Article, the basic thrust of the scheme developed
here has general applicability. The study begins with a survey of the
uses and theories of assessment of a property tax. Next, the economic
consequences of such a tax are explored, with emphasis on the equity of
the tax in relation to the services it supports and its effect on resource
allocation. Current legal approaches to disparities in state and local
services are then examined. After reviewing the current status of
the law, an alternative method of approaching these disparities is
suggested. Finally, brief illustrations of the alternative approach will
be offered, using Texas as a laboratory state. This effort is intended
only as a preliminary examination of the problem and does not pretend
to supply the definitive answer.
B.

Utilization of the Property Tax

As a prelude to this Article, the role of the property tax as a
supplier of revenue for the support of governmentally provided services
must be placed in perspective. Historically, the various states have
utilized the property tax similarly. In large measure, this tax base has
been reserved for local governments, with the state governments utiliz3. H.R. Doe. No. 92-44, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1971).
4. In 1967-68, the property tax accounted for $26,835,300,000 out of a total local
tax revenue of $31,171,400,000. The only other significant taxes levied by local
governments include sales taxes, accounting for $1,932,000,000, and personal income
taxes, accounting for $1,077,000,000. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, STATE AND LOCAL FINANCES: SIGNIFICANT FEATURES 1967-1970, at 30
(1969) [hereinafter cited as SIGNIFICANT FEATURES].
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ing different revenue sources. Despite this apparent similarity, a basic
dissimilarity, which is the focus of this analysis, has arisen among the
states. This dissimilarity lies in the different demands the various
state governments impose upon local governmental units in financing
programs, particularly in the areas of welfare and education. It is the
significance and consequences of these differentials that form the factual
basis of this Article.'
In seeking to identify the relationship of the property tax to
service levels, tax equity, and the role that the equal protection clause
of the Federal Constitution should play in rationalizing this relationship,
specific references will be made to the manner in which Texas employs
this tax base. In this respect, Texas is among those states that impose
relatively moderate demands upon local taxpayers to support local
services, particularly welfare. At the other end of the spectrum, New
Jersey is among those states that assign a primary role to the utilization
of locally raised property tax revenue in support of public programs.6
Texas, then, will be used as an example in order to present certain
concrete empirical illustrations which are offered only as a point of
departure. Throughout this inquiry, certain underlying functional
considerations 7 should be kept in mind. In this respect, it is clear that,
oftentimes, the support that particular programs will receive will be
5. See id. at 53 (Table 18).
6. Id. at 50-51 (Table 16).
7. "Functional consideration," as used here, involves the interrelationship between
the use of a given tax to support a given service and the ensuing effects among taxpayers and quality of governmental service.
If taxpayers, or purchasers of particular public services, perceive benefits
from a particular program and feel that the distribution of the burden of paying for
such a program is fair, then the program will probably be well funded. To the extent
that this proposition is correct, its converse would seem correct also. Therefore,
policymakers' choice of a tax base and its structure would appear to be a critical
decision in terms of how well supported a given service will be.
The recent election in El Paso concerning whether the county should be
authorized to levy a local property tax to supplement state aid for the El Paso County
Junior College underscores the problem. In that election, property owners voted
2 to 1 against the proposal, indicating that, as a class, they perceived little benefit
from increased expenditures, at their expense, for a junior college. See El Paso Times,
Aug. 31, 1972, at 1, col. 3.
Subsequently, one disgruntled property owner justified his negative vote in
the following terms:
[Tihe property owner has become tired of being the "fall guy." I do not object
to paying a fair share for a worthy program such as the Community College. But
what I do object to is being saddled with tax after tax past the saturation point,
while others who should share in the cost are reaping the harvest at my expense.
When the governments, local, county and state, establish an equitable tax
structure, I will support all programs that I deem worthy of support. Until that
time comes, I will continue to resist additional taxes, and I will encourage others
to do likewise.
El Paso Times, Sept. 5, 1972, at 5, col. 3.
At the outset of this study, then, there should be an awareness that regardless of the merits of a particular program, taxpayer-perceived defects in the tax scheme
for financing given programs can result in underfinancing of otherwise "worthy"
programs.
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largely determined by which tax base is used to supply revenue and
how the rates of that tax are skewed. It is within this framework that
the uses of the property tax by state government, school districts, and
county and special districts will be examined.
1.

State Government

While in the broad sense all property taxes are state taxes levied
pursuant to the taxing power of the state, "the property tax" is really
not a single tax, but rather a cluster of separate taxes utilized by
different units of government in different ways with each particular
tax sharing only the same name and some of the same underlying
aspects. Different amounts of supervision of the property taxes are
exercised by different states. Some states exercise broad supervision
in terms of what is within the tax base, what assessment ratio should
be used, what the maximum and minimum rates should be, how
much debt should be allowed on a tax base, and how the rules should
be administered, while others exercise very little supervision.' Although
these administrative problems are important, they are not central to
this inquiry.
Initially, under the Texas constitution, the property tax was
envisioned as the primary tax source for the general revenue fund. 9
However, its role as a revenue producer has steadily declined, until, in
1951, a constitutional amendment ended the tax altogether." Property
taxes continued to be collected at the state level for the support of
public education, but even this function has recently been terminated.
In 1967, Texans approved a constitutional amendment phasing out
the statewide-collected property tax by 1978, thus ending the last major
state demand for revenue on property taxpayers." The conclusion by
Texas that the property tax is an unsuitable device for financing the
8. For a discussion of the state-local relationship in property tax administration
and of policy tensions growing out of this relationship, see Shannon, Conflict Between
State Assessment Law and Local Assessment Practice, in PROPERTY TAXATION
USA 39 (R. LINDHOLM ed. 1967).
9. Although in the early years the property tax served as a major revenue
source for the state, its importance faded with the emergence of natural resource
taxation. In the early 1930's, the depression acted as a catalyst for abolishing it. The
lack of uniformity in its administration on both an intracounty and intercounty basis
created much public dissatisfaction. To a large extent, each county administered the
state property tax as it saw fit. Assessed valuations varied significantly among the
counties, and taxable property was frequently omitted from the tax rolls. In short,
the state tax burden was spread unevenly among localities, and there was too little
public support for this form of taxation to justify renovating its administration. See
L. ANDERSON,

THE STATE PROPERTY TAX IN TEXAS: REQUIEM OR REJUVENATION

1-4 (1963).
10. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(a).

11. Id. § 1(e).
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expanding cost of government at the state level,' 2 and the consequent
reduction of the state's reliance upon such a tax, is typical among
the states.
One interesting pattern of misuse of the property tax exists in
New Jersey, where the state has constructed a method of financing
various welfare programs with local property tax revenues.' 3 Although
an agency of the state government prescribes rules and regulations for
uniform administration, much of the responsibility of paying for these
programs has been assigned to county governments. Simply stated,
for the broad range of these programs, the counties are required to pay
25 per cent of the cost of the program within each county.' 4 County
governments have no say, however, in determining benefit levels, or
whether or not to tax. Under this scheme they must not only dispense
state-determined benefits, but must tax local resources to pay the
costs.'" As might be expected, the incidence of welfare recipients
varies among the counties. Illustrating how this results in tax inequity,
Essex County has 12.97 per cent of New Jersey's population, but
27.48 per cent of its welfare recipients. 6 Based on the fact that the
wealth of the property tax base varies among the counties, the property
tax levies to support these programs at the local level will similarly
vary significantly, sometimes by as much as 1000 per cent.
The pattern of financing education is that, generally, the states
make virtually no effort to impose uniform service levels on disparate tax bases, but rather permit localities to fund services according
to local choice. In New Jersey's system of financing welfare, in which
the state dictates benefit levels, certain economic pressures are generated
by the unequal incidence of the tax on a geographic basis; however, in
the general scheme of financing education the economic pressures
are avoided, but at the expense of service disparities. The economic
effects of both service-level disparaties and its reciprocal, geographic
tax-level disparities, will be examined in depth below.' 7
12. The dependence of state governments on property taxes has fallen from over
50 per cent in 1902 to 1.3 per cent in 1962. Presently, then, property taxes represent
a negligible source of revenue for state governments. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTER-

GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, II
THE ROLE OF THE STATES IN STRENGTHENING THE
PROPERTY TAX 71 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as STRENGTHENING THE PROPERTY TAX].

For a detailed history of the property tax, see J. JENSEN,

IN THE UNITED STATES

(1931).

PROPERTY TAXATION

13. These programs include the categorical programs of Old Age Assistance,
REV. STAT. § 44:7-6 (1940) ; Aid to the Totally and Permanently Disabled, N.J.
REV. STAT. § 44:7-41 (Supp. 1972) ; Aid to the Blind, Id. § 44:7-44; Aid to Families
with Dependent Children, Id. §§ 44:10-1 et seq.; and Aid to the Working Poor, Id.
§§ 44:13-1 et seq.
N.J.

14. Id.

15. This method of financing welfare has recently been challenged in a class
action suit. Bonnet v. Cahill, Civil No. L-3865-72 (Super. Ct. N.J., filed Oct. 11, 1972).
16. Id. at 21-22.
17. See text accompanying notes 58-112 infra.
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2.

School Districts

At present, independent school districts in Texas constitute the
major drain on the property tax, utilizing 51.2 per cent of the total
property tax revenue in 1969." s In 1940, only 35 per cent of property
tax revenue went to school districts.'
Since then, schools have increased their percentage share each year and in recent years at an
accelerating rate.2" This situation is ironic because, in Texas, local
school districts had been initially denied taxing authority.21 Subsequently, such authority was conferred in two stages, first in 1883,22
and then in 1909.23 Placing taxing responsibility at the local level for
a large share of the cost of education has created a seemingly insoluble
problem. All local districts do not now and never have had the same
tax base.2 4 Because of the wide disparities in capability to finance
education at the local level, the Texas legislature enacted the Foundation School Program (FSP) in 1949 in an attempt to "equalize" the
financial burden among the various school districts for support of the
25
basic programs vital to each district.
It is worthwhile to explore briefly Texas' attempt at state-wide
equalization of the property tax, because efforts in this direction
18. Letter from Texas Research League to the author, Mar. 15, 1971, in which
total local property taxes are compared with school property taxes (1940-1970) and
with projections of school taxes to 1979 (on file with Villanova Law Review).

19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id.
TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (1876).
TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (1883).

23. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (1909).
24. A standard index for measuring the relative tax bases among school districts
is the ratio of taxable property to average daily attendance (ADA). The Ector
and Edgewood Independent School Districts illustrate the difference in tax bases
among Texas school districts of similar size. Ector has a tax base of about $26,000
per ADA, while Edgewood has a tax base of only $3,600 per ADA. Since Edgewood
assesses at 35 per cent of market value and Ector at 30 per cent, this disparity is
magnified. These figures are computed from information in the following materials:
C. BARTLETT,

PROPERTY TAXES IN TEXAS SCHOOL DISTRICTS: A STUDY FOR THE
GOVERNOR'S COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SCHOOL EDUCATION (1969) ; TEXAS EDUCATION
AGENCY, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT: 1968-69, PART 2, at 2 (1970)
[hereinafter
cited as TEA REPORT] ; and TEXAS MUNICIPAL ADVISORY COUNCIL, SPECIAL REPORT
No. 80, at 35 (1971) [hereinafter cited as MUNICIPAL REPORT].

25. In order to avoid confusion, the FSP applies only to certain elements of the
overall program of education. Under the FSP, the state guarantees each school district minimal pupil-teacher ratios and minimal teachers' salaries, as well as certain
basic programs including special education, vocational education, kindergarten, and
transportation. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 16.01 to .98 (1972). If localities want
smaller pupil-teacher ratios, higher teachers' salaries, and additional programs, they
must finance them locally from the property tax. School construction is also a purely
local concern which, in large part, explains the differences in quality of plant throughout the state. Local expenditures above the FSP are called "enrichment," Capacity
to "enrich" education locally will be discussed below. See notes 100-12 and accompanying text infra. For a brief history of the development and purpose of the FSP,
see V REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SCHOOL EDUCATION: THE
CHALLENGE AND THE CHANCE (1969) [hereinafter cited as COPSE REPORT]. This
approach is for the most part typical among the states.
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continue to be the approach taken by many states in solving variations
in taxable property wealth from district to district.2" Theoretically,
there are three methods of channeling revenue from greater to lesser
taxing authorities: the social equity approach, the incentive matching
approach, and the political economy approach. In the social equity
approach, the state determines the level of performance or the money
outlay per unit of need, and equalizes one or the other factor among
its constituent school districts; neither the economic capacity nor the
tax effort of the districts play any role in determining the amount
of the state subsidy. The state provides no incentive for local supplementation. In the incentive, or matching grant approach, the individual districts determine the level of performance or the money
outlay per unit of need, and thus no equalization of performance levels,
money outlays, fiscal capacity, or tax effort results. In the political
economy approach, the state merely equalizes the fiscal potential of
the constituent districts, with each district then determining its own
outlay per unit of need.2"
The Texas FSP most nearly resembles the political economy
approach by which the state, through a distribution formula, sends
greater amounts of state aid to poor districts in an effort to place them
in parity with wealthier districts.2" Texas, as most other states, uses
an equalization program to compensate, though only partially, for
interdistrict wealth disparities.2 9
To date, however, no state has devised an equalization program
or formula based on utilization of the property tax which has proven
capable of establishing financial parity among its school districts.
In this respect, the inequities of various state formulae have recently
0
attracted the attention of the courts, most notably in Serrano v. Priest"
3
1
and Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District. In an
effort to come to grips with this problem at the political level, Governor
William Milliken of Michigan proposed a totally state-financed educa26. See ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE AID
TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT 31-59 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as STATE AID TO LOCAL
GOVERNMENT].
27, D. MORGAN & F. HAYDEN, ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION AID:
TOWARD AN OPTIMAL PROGRAM FOR THE STATE GOVERNMENT OF TEXAS 13 (1970).
28. Despite the conceptual similarity of the FSP financing provisions with the
political economy approach, significant elements of the incentive matching approach
also appear in the distribution formula of state aid to local districts. For a detailed
discussion, see id. at 56-83.
29. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.74 (1972). The Texas equalization program,
as well as those presently utilized by most other states, is a direct outgrowth of an
approach pioneered by George Strayer and Robert Haig. For the history of this
device of coordinating state aid to local education, see G. STRAYER & R. HAIG, THE
FINANCING OF EDUCATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1923).
30. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
31. 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1972), rev'd, 93 S. Ct. 1278 (1973).
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tion program as an alternative to Michigan's heavy reliance on property taxation.3 2 In any event, equal educational opportunity, in terms
of equalized financial potential, depends upon the development of
better formulae for apportioning the property tax burden among
localities. Evaluation of whether this search for a better index is
worth the effort, or whether a new direction such as the Michigan
approach is necessary, must await an analysis of the interdistrict
economic effects of property taxation.
3.

Cities

Second only to schools, cities in Texas claim the largest share
of the property tax. For instance, in 1966 municipalities raised $305.2
million from this tax source which represented 28.7 per cent of the
total. 3 Despite passage of a one per cent optional city sales tax,
3 4
property taxes still provide the major revenue source for Texas cities.
Though cities and school districts both rely on the property tax, the
role of the tax for each is fundamentally different.
Neither cities nor schools have a local alternative tax source,
but cities, unlike schools, have access to outside sources of revenue.
These alternative revenue sources for cities are geared to the services
municipalities typically perform. Functionally, these include fire and
police protection, public safety, health, streets and highways, sanitation,
public works, utilities, and general administration. Certain of these
services are susceptible to being financed through user charges 5 on
the basis of the benefits received. Using Fort Worth as an example,
its airport funds and water and sewer operating fund sustain themselves without property tax transfers, while its parks and recreation
32. Pointing to the siphoning of $1.181 billion of property tax revenue for a
system of education that tolerates interdistrict per pupil expenditures ranging from
$500 to $1200, Governor Milliken proposed the virtual elimination of property taxation
for support of education. As alternative revenue sources, he suggested replacing the
$700 million in property tax revenue paid by individuals with a personal income tax,
and the $500 million paid by businesses with a value-added tax. Address by Governor
Milliken, Special Message to the Legislature on Excellence in Education - Equity in
Taxation, April 12, 1971, at 5 (mimeograph release on file at Villanova Law Review)
[hereinafter cited as Address by Governor Milliken].
33. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, VII CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS: 1967, STATE
REPORTS TEXAS].

[hereinafter cited as STATE
TEXAS 29 (1969)
These census reports are published every five years. As a
REPORTS

result, the next publication will be based on 1971-72 figures and will be printed in
1973. Except in particular instances, this data is the most recent available.
34. Fort Worth's relative dependence on the property tax points out its continued importance, even after passage of the sales tax. In 1970-71, Fort Worth
received $8,500,000 in sales tax revenue as compared with $21,539,098 in property
tax revenue. CITY OF FORT WORTH, SUMMARY: ANNUAL BUDGET (1970-71), § 2,
at 3 (1970).
35. F. MICHELMAN & I. SANDALOW, MATERIALS ON GOVERNMENT IN URBAN AREAS
709-10 (1970).
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funds only require 53 per cent and 49 per cent transfers, respectively."0
Even the general revenue fund, from which most municipal services
are financed, required only 49 per cent of its revenue from the property
tax. 7 This user tax technique, as an ameliorant to overreliance on
property taxation, is utilized in varying degrees by major cities
in Texas.38
While Texas attempts "equalization" of property tax revenue
potential for school districts by means of the FSP, it makes no corresponding effort on behalf of cities. Also, while the state contributes
$950.9 million39 to local school districts, it has no general program
of state aid to cities. With respect to this lack of state aid, Texas
municipalities, unlike those in other states which have extensive stateaid programs, are not permitted either to supplement welfare or to
subsidize public housing programs."0 Under the Texas approach then,
cities support only basic municipal services and not a full range of
social and welfare programs.
4.

Counties and Other Political Subdivisions

In 1967 counties absorbed 17.3 per cent of the Texas property
tax and special districts absorbed the remaining 3.7 per cent." Analysis
of revenue raised locally reveals that counties use the property tax
similarly to cities, with the exception that the legislature has authorized
cities to add a one per cent sales tax 42 to lighten the property tax load.

Generally speaking, counties, like cities, use a combination of property
tax revenue and user and licensing fees to finance their services. On
a state-wide average, counties finance approximately 64 per cent of
their services through the property tax as compared with only 37
per cent by municipalities.43 Because of the different roles that counties
and cities play in the overall scheme of local government, important
differences in their utilization of the property tax exist.
36.

CITY OF FORT

38.

CITY OF

WORTH,

37. Id. at 13, 15.

supra note 34, at 26, 27.

FORT WORTH,

FACTS

&

FIGURES

FOR

THE FIscAL YEAR

ENDING

30, 1971, at 107 (1971).
39. This figure represents FSP cost to the state for fiscal year 1972. TEXAS
COMPTROLLER OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS, REVENUE ESTIMATES 1971-73, at 11 (1971).
40. The only subsidy that public housing authorities receive from local governments is an exemption from paying property taxes. Conversely, however, the state
constitution forbids these districts to be operated at a profit. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
SEPTEMBER

ANN. art. 1269k (1963).

41. STATE REPORTS - TEXAS, supra note 33.
42. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1066c (Supp. 1972).
43. These figures are computed by finding the respective percentages of property
tax revenues to total locally raised revenue, including user charges and utility revenue.
State and federal revenue provided to cities and counties is marginal. STATE REPORTS TEXAS, supra note 33. With the passage of the city sales tax, urban reliance on the
property tax, as compared with counties, is further reduced.
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Counties, unlike cities, have little flexibility in experimenting with
the user-charge or licensing-fee concept as an alternative to overburdening the property tax base. Although certain county services
parallel and even overlap municipal services, such as roads, law enforcement, and public health and sanitation, county governments serve
as the agent of the state rather than as a public corporation organized
for the benefit of the citizens within its boundaries. For example,
in Texas the state delegates to the counties many of its functions,
such as welfare administration, voter registration, automobile licensing,
and maintenance of a court system. In large measure, the state, not
the county, determines which of these functions are to be financed
through fees and which through property taxes. Despite the built-in
inflexibility, the pattern of county finance does reflect an effort to
make most of the administrative services of the county self-sustaining
and to limit use of property taxes for the support of services which
benefit property owners more than other citizens.44 But until Texas
moves in the direction of county home rule and consolidation of citycounty services, county reliance on the property tax as its basic
general revenue source will continue.
Though accounting for only a marginal amount of the total
property tax dollar, special districts offer an important illustration.
As creatures of the state, these districts, authorized either by the
constitution or by statute, permit the citizens of a particular area
to form a political subdivision to perform a particular function or
functions,4 5 and, depending on their purpose, they may or may not
possess taxing power.4 6 Fire protection, hospitals, airports, housing
and urban renewal, drainage, flood control, irrigation, water and soil
conservation, and sewage represent some of the services that these
47
governmental units provide.
44. Using Travis County as an example, the special road-and-bridge fund and the
farm-to-market road fund are supported by earmarked property taxes. Both of these
funds support a service that benefits property owners and property. Without transportation arteries the value of the land would be severely diminished; in this instance,
property owners get what they pay for and can determine just how much of a given
service they need. Based on this criteria, the overall financing of the special roadand-bridge fund presents an interesting, if rudimentary, illustration of the benefit
principle. In addition to property tax revenue, automobile licensing fees and rebates
from the state gasoline tax represent a further effort to tax those who benefit from a

given service.

TRAVIS

COUNTY,

OPERATING

BUDGET:

CALENDAR

YEAR

1971, at

37 (1971).
Although this plan of taxation does not reflect a precise cost-benefit analysis
as a measure of tax liability, it does, nevertheless, reveal a general effort to pay part
of the cost of transportation by means of a user-fee concept.

45. See W. BENTON,

TEXAS: ITS GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

383-84 (2d ed. 1966).

46. In fact, of the 1001 districts in the state, only 477 have the power to levy
property taxes. STATE REPORTS - TEXAS, supra note 33, at 13.

47. For a somewhat dated but still useful survey of special districts in Texas,
see W. THROMBLEY, SPECIAL DISTRICTS AND AUTHORITIES IN TEXAS (1959).
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Typically, either local property taxpayers themselves, or city or
county governments, organize these instrumentalities to provide locally
desired services.48 Unlike counties, these subdivisions exercise no
state functions but exist only to provide services. Most districts need
not, and cannot, exist without the support or acquiescence of the
property owners within their boundaries. When the local property
owners' need or desire for a given service ends, the district may be
dissolved ;49 counties, on the other hand, have an independent existence.
For the most part, the services that these districts provide
inure principally to the benefit of property owners. As an example,
water control and improvement districts serve as a device to make
possible programs concerning public water utilities, flood control,
drainage, irrigation, and preservation of water."0 The nature of these
services precludes property owners from undertaking the services
themselves or from purchasing them from private enterprise. Practicality dictates that a governmental tool, similar in many respects to
a private corporation, be organized to meet these needs. In reality,
this device is little more than a nonprofit public corporation, retaining only those governmental characteristics, such as the power
of eminent domain, necessary to permit it to function successfully.
Even the theory of taxation reflects the unique relationship between
this kind of governmental entity and the property owner. All water
improvement and control districts may tax on a benefit basis instead
of levying a property tax. Under the benefit option, property owners
finance the district by paying specifically for the benefits that they
receive according to a formula established by the local board.51 Here,
just as with municipalities' financing of certain utilities, the user, not
the property taxpayer, pays for the benefits received.
While many of the services performed by special districts benefit
property owners more directly than the general populace, some do
not. Airport, junior college, and hospital districts are examples of
governmental services funded by property owners which do not directly
benefit them. In each of these instances, the financing of services by
means of the property tax must be justified on some basis other than
benefits conferred to the service recipient.
48. Id. at 54-59.
49. Water control districts serve as examples of a special district which can be

dissolved by the property owners themselves when the service provided by that dis-

trict is no longer "beneficial" or becomes "impractical." TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 7880-77b (1954).
50. See W. THROMBLEY, supra note 47, at 61-65.
51.

TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7880-30 (1954).
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Summary

The evolution of the use of the property tax in Texas as a revenue
source for the support of governmental services has, for the most part,
followed functional lines. With the exception of education and public
hospitals, property tax revenue primarily supports local services that
offer disproportionate benefits to property owners, thereby establishing
a rational and equitable connection between the revenue source and
the governmental expenditure. Additionally, Texas property owners
have been spared responsibility for supplementing welfare52 and supporting public housing locally. Since cities, counties, and special districts use the property tax for predominantly local purposes, the state
makes no effort at intergovernmental equalization of revenue potential.
On the theory that the quality of local services is a local concern, no
justification appears for state administration of the property tax for
these governmental bodies.5" Texas, like most other states, has recognized that the property tax is a poor revenue producer for its general
revenue fund. As a result, the state has phased out use of the property
tax in favor of more broadly based, fast growth taxes. Only in its
52. See text accompanying notes 13-16 supra.
53. If revenue from various property tax bases can be limited to the support of
governmental services having an economic impact coextensive with each tax base
(see notes 200-38 and accompanying text infra), then only those taxpayers within
each individual tax base should be heard to complain about tax inequities within their
respective subdivisions. If, on the other hand, property tax bases support services
with greater economic impact than that which any individual tax base covers, alleged
tax inequities in one area will affect all, thus giving every taxpayer in the state an
economic interest in fighting for tax equity in every district. The latter pattern, in
fact, prompted the court in Weissinger v. Boswell, 330 F. Supp. 615 (M.D. Ala.
1971), to compel the State of Alabama to equalize assessment ratios in all districts
throughout the state. A petition in Fort Worth Independent School Dist. v. Edgar,
Civil No. 4-1405 (N.D. Tex., filed Feb. 13, 1971), relying on the same theory as
Boswell, is currently challenging certain aspects of Texas' use of the property tax
to finance education. In Texas, the alleged discrimination involves use of countyassessed valuations. At present there is no standardization of county assessment
ratios or appraisal techniques. Essentially, both cases seek to use the equal protection
clause to guarantee that the state treat all property taxpayers alike and that no
locality gain a tax preference at the expense of any other.
A close reading of Boswell, however, does not lead to the conclusion that
local tax bases supporting local services have to be "equalized" in terms of assessment
ratios; the property tax in question in both Boswell and Fort Worth involved a
statewide tax. These cases, as a result, will not necessarily compel "equalized"
assessment ratios in cities and special districts. But, where Boswell does apply, as
with property taxation with statewide impact, if assessment ratios must be "equalized,"
then logically, appraisal techniques must also be standardized. Presently in Texas, as
in most states, there are about as many appraisal techniques as there are tax offices.
Therefore, application of Boswell could lead to the creation of a single standard
with new and massive administrative machinery to enforce it. Considering the problems inherent in administering the property tax equitably within a relatively small
area, one can imagine the difficulties of administering the tax statewide.
From an administrative standpoint, then, a strong case can be made that
the property tax should be confined to purely local use. Otherwise, the tax will inevitably become either grossly inequitable or too cumbersome to administer. In either
case, the unpopularity of this tax, as compared with other taxes, will increase, and
the services dependent upon it for financing will suffer.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol18/iss4/1

12

Moon and Moon: The Property Tax, Governmental Services, and Equal Protection: A
MARCH

1973]

A

RATIONAL ANALYSIS

support of education is the property tax utilized to finance a major
governmental service with an extra-local impact. The cost of education,
which doubles about every seven or eight years,54 threatens preemption
of property tax revenue at the expense of other governments.
Although the property tax burden in Texas is relatively light,
particularly when compared to the Northeast and Far West,5" the
burden is sufficient to deprive various local governments of needed
revenue. Moreover, in inflationary times taxpayers especially guard
against tax increases. In this respect property owners have the capacity,
because of the closeness and immediacy of the taxing jurisdiction, to
register their resentment against high taxes by voting down local bond
issues. 6 The previously mentioned method of financing welfare in
New Jersey, in which disproportionate tax burdens resulted, is a clear
example of how municipal services can be starved if a state makes
inappropriate demands on a local tax base. With a number of local
governments drawing upon the property tax for support, tax responsibility is difficult to place. To ameliorate this problem, some
of the strain should be taken off property taxpayers. This reduction
of demands upon the property tax for revenue should be across the
board, not on a piecemeal basis favoring one group at the expense
of another. 7 While financial resources can be allocated to local govern54. See Letter from Texas Research League, supra note 18.
55. Using per capita amounts as the yardstick, Texas raises only $100.02 through
the property tax, as compared with $150.54 for the Northeast and $167.22 for the
West. California utilizes the property tax more intensively than any other state -

at $199.56.
MENTS:

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,

U.S.

DEP'T OF COMMERCE,

1967, TAXABLE PROPERTY VALUES (1968)

II CENSUS

OF GOVERN-

[hereinafter cited as TAXABLE

PROPERTY VALUES].

56. The process of assignment of a rating to municipal bonds, which involves
the concept of "overlapping debt," illustrates the interrelationship of local governments.
For instance, municipal bond analysts adhere to a rule of thumb that "overlapping debt
(debt incurred by various local governments covering the same property subject to
taxation) should not exceed 10% of assessed valuation . . . ." A. RABINOWITZ,
MUNICIPAL BOND FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION 136 (1969). In view of this informally imposed ceiling, questions may be raised concerning how much of this limit
each local government should be entitled to preempt from the others.
57. As property tax burdens increase, political pressure builds for tax exemptions. Church property is among the most important of the exemptions in Texas and
in the United States. See M. LARSON, CHURCH WEALTH AND BUSINESS INCOME
(1965). Particularly in recent years, legislatures throughout the country have granted
increased exemptions to the elderly. See Yung-Ping Chen, Present Status and Fiscal
Significance of Property Tax Exemptions for the Aged, 18 NAT'L TAX J. 162 (1965).
In Wisconsin, the legislature has provided for a program of property tax relief for
the poor through the use of tax credits. See Quindry & Cook, Humanization of the
Property Tax for Low Income Households, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 357 (1969). For a
penetrating argument against all nongovernmental property tax exemptions, see
Bennett, Real Property Tax Exemptions of Non-Profit Organizations,2 ASSESSORS J.

34 (1967).
On balance, tax exemptions for some only add to existing inequities. Rather

than rewarding those who exercise political muscle in the legislature to gain an
exemption at the expense of the remaining taxpayers, a more equitable approach
would seem to seek fundamental changes in the use of the property tax. See notes

239-45 and accompanying text infra.
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ments in a variety of ways, such a plan should not be based on the
needs of the moment, but upon an awareness of the economic problems
involved in using a given tax for a particular purpose. Analysis of
the property tax in this context will follow a survey of methods by
which the tax burden is apportioned among property owners.
II.

TAX EQUITY AND THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE
PROPERTY TAX

Although the property tax has historically been a major source
of local revenue, it has theoretical and practical shortcomings that
justify a careful examination of its economic effects." Local reliance
on the property tax has created inequitable taxing patterns and distortions in resource allocation. By studying the property tax in terms
of incidence equity59 and resource allocation, alternative models of
state-local finance can be created that spread the tax burden more
fairly and efficiently among the taxpaying population.

A.

External Equity

"External equity," a traditional criterion for evaluating a tax,
describes how fairly the property tax apportions the cost of governmental services among all taxpayers. It focuses upon the relationship
of revenue sources to government expenditures and the relative benefit
the taxpayer receives for his tax payment. The concept is grounded
in a traditional tax benefit analysis6" based upon the assumption that
those deriving the ultimate benefit of a governmental service should
pay for it. Since the component groups of today's society are so
58. This section is intended to give only a general overview of some of the
economic effects of the property tax and to point out some of the tax's more serious
flaws when used for the support of particular government services. This section is
neither exhaustive nor definitive, but does present some of the major problems
associated with the tax. Although many of these problems may well be mitigated
by the thought reflected in the adage, "an old tax is a fair tax," many still remain.
See generally Bridges, Income Elasticity of the Property Tax Base, 17 NAT'L TAX
J. 253 (1964); Harriss, Economic Evaluation of Real Property Taxes, 28 PROCEEDINGS ACADEMY POL. ScI. 489 (1967) ; Rostvold, Distribution of Property, Retail
Sales, and Personal Income Tax Burdens in California: An Empirical Analysis of
Inequity in Taxation, 19 NAT'L TAX J. 38 (1966).
59. "Incidence equity" is a phrase selected to represent a broad evaluation of a
particular tax in terms of its incidence; that is, who bears the final economic burden
of the tax, and how fairly is the burden of a particular service distributed. See Hady,
The Incidence of the Personal Property Tax, 15 NAT'L TAX J. 368 (1962) ; Oates,
The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property Values, 77
J. POL. EcoN. 957 (1969) ; Sears, Incidence Profiles of a Real Estate Tax and
Earned Income Tax: A Study in the Formal, Differential Incidence of Selected Local
Taxes, 17 NAT'L TAX J. 340 (1964).
60. The benefits-received principle of taxation asserts that households and businesses should purchase the goods and services of government in basically the same
manner in which other commodities are bought. C. MCCONNELL, EcoNoMics 150

(3d ed. 1966).
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interrelated and the services performed by government so numerous,
services supplied to one group of taxpayers often redound to the
benefit of many others. Moreover, any of the services may "spillover"
and may benefit persons outside the principal governmental jurisdiction
that finances and supplies them. Even though it is obviously difficult
to weigh and apportion the benefits of a variety of governmental
functions among specific family or business units,61 the approach is
still useful.
Regardless of the spillovers and the inherent difficulty in isolating
relative benefits, services can appropriately be classified as either private
or social." "Private services" are those that can readily be identified
as primarily benefitting discrete businesses and family units - such
as garbage collection and water and sewer service. Often the benefit
is related to the consumer's use or ownership of property. These
services more nearly approximate "proprietary"" services that could
be performed by businesses. "Social services" are those that benefit the
community as a whole - such as education, fire and police protection,
and welfare. However, as with education, the immediate benefit of
many social services may initially be conferred directly on identifiable
individuals. Since the line between the two classifications is oftentimes
blurred, the final classification may have to be arbitrary. 4
The classification of the service as social or private should determine how that service is to be financed. Since social services benefit
the community as a whole, they should be financed by broadly based
taxes; private services should be supported by financing resembling
user charges.6 5 However, the spillover effect further complicates the
61. The real difficulty arises in the attempt to apportion on a benefit basis the
cost of a social service that benefits the whole community. Such services should be
supported by broadly based taxes instead of being funded on a benefit basis.
62. The terms "private" and "social" are utilized for the purposes of this study
and may differ, in some respects, from other statements. See, e.g., G. BREAK, INTERGOVERNMENTAL

FISCAL RELATIONS

IN

THE UNITED

STATES

63-64 (1967).

63. This classification is similar to the traditional tort distinction concerning
exceptions to sovereign immunity. The critical point is that these services resemble
other privately supplied business services. For example, both water service and
garbage collection could be operated as regulated utilities, as electricity service often is.
See, e.g., Vickrey, General and Specific Financing of Urban Services, in PUBLIC
EXPENDITURE DECISIONS IN THE URBAN COMMUNITY 62, 64-70 (H. Schaller ed. 1962).
64. One writer has classified a wide range of governmentally performed services
as suitable for local, intermediate, or federal financing based on a combination of the
social-private dichotomy and the spillover effect. Local services include, for example,
fire protection, police protection, parks and recreation, public libraries, water distribution, and city streets. Intermediate services include air and water pollution control,
water supply, parks and recreation, public libraries, sewage and refuse disposal, mass
transit, arterial streets and intercity highways, airports, and urban planning and
renewal. Federal services include education, parks and recreation, aid to low-income
groups, communicable disease control, and research. G. BREAK, supra note 62, at 69.
65. User charges refer to payments made by the consumers of a service which
are commensurate with the cost of providing them with the service. Payment for
water is essentially suited to user charges because the benefit accrues to a discrete
unit and can be quantitatively measured.
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premise of "pay for what you get." Since spillover is a geographical
concept, the optimal area-wide unit for provision of the service should
be defined. Those services having the greatest spillover - education
and welfare in all forms - should be supported by as large a governmental unit as possible.66
Examination of the budget of Fort Worth, Texas, illustrates an
approach to the classification problem. For the purposes of this study,
the municipally financed services will be limited to the following broad
categories: public safety (fire and police protection), traffic engineering, public health, public works (including garbage collection), government administration, parks and recreation, water and sewage, library,
and airport. Fort Worth finances these services by a variety of
revenue sources, including the property tax, sales tax, user charges,
and licenses. 67 It segregates its revenue into the following five earmarked funds: the general fund, the airport fund, the water and
sewer fund, the parks and recreation fund, and the library fund. Fort
Worth's segregation of the funds and the manner in which it finances
each fund is at least suggestive of the aforementioned external equity
concept and its classification system. 8
Those services classified as private should be as nearly selfsufficient as practicable. Since the individual benefit can easily be
quantified and identified with a specific user, water and sewer service
is an especially good example of a private service capable of supporting
itself through user charges. In fact, Fort Worth's water and sewage
system is self-sufficient, even though it is the single most costly
municipally provided service.6 9 Similarly, airport facilities are fully
financed by user charges with the result that those deriving the direct
benefit of the service pay for it.
On the other hand, the library and parks and recreation funds
receive substantial aid from the property tax. 70 However, almost onefourth of the revenue for the parks and recreation fund is derived
from user charges for recreational facilities. 7' Many of the largest
66. Ideally, the geographic bounds of a governmental unit providing a particular
service should be coextensive with the spillover effects of the service. Such a structure limits payment for the service to those who receive the benefit. National defense,
for example, benefits the entire country and should be financed nationally. The benefits
of fire protection, on the other hand, are limited to a small geographic area and
should be financed locally.
67. CITY OF FORT WORTH, supra note 34, at 2-3.
68. Although its classification system differs from the one proposed by this author,
Fort Worth's attempt to make many services self-sufficient is consistent with the spirit
of the suggested approach. See notes 200-38 and accompanying text infra.
69. CITY OF FORT WORTH, supra note 34, at 2, 8.
70. The parks and recreation fund received $1,728,382 of its $3,365,560 from
the property tax. The library fund received $667,031 of its $1,359,781 from the
property tax. Id. at 3.
71. User charges account for $701,350. Id.
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recreation expenditures such as maintenance of golf courses, more
than support themselves.7 2 Again, this activity is particularly susceptible
to user charges because the recipient of the benefit is easily identified
and because relatively few members of the community use it.
The Fort Worth general fund supports public safety, traffic engineering, public works, and government administration. Most of these
services more nearly fall into the social service category. 73 The property tax is responsible for nearly one-half of the revenues constituting
74
the general fund.
B.

Internal Equity

"Internal equity" describes how fairly the property tax is apportioned among the members of the class intended to pay it. It focuses
upon the ability of the one making the initial payment to shift the
ultimate tax burden away from himself.
1.

Incidence

Initial property tax payments come from two basic groups, businessmen and homeowners. Businesses typically possess the ability to
pass the tax forward to consumers or backward to factors of production,
thereby effectively avoiding the tax. Homeowners, on the other hand,
must absorb the tax themselves. This ability of some businesses to
pass the cost on may very well be determinative of the kinds and
quality of services a local government can provide. Consideration of
a few hypothetical cases may illustrate the manner in which businesses
shift the tax and the likelihood of a particular locality having quality
education or any other social service financed by the property tax.
Concentrating on the effect of supporting education through the
property tax is especially appropriate because education consumes the
7
greatest share of local property taxes. 1
a.

Shifting of the Property Tax Burden

Forward shifting generally occurs where a school district has
a firm within its jurisdiction which possesses a substantial degree of
market power. Since the firm has at least a limited power to raise
prices, an increase in property taxes within that district alone will be
72. Golf courses produce $540,000 in revenue and cost $356,708 to operate. Id.

at 9, 26.
73. Public safety services also have a private aspect because they benefit individuals through the property they own or occupy.
74. The general fund totals $40,354,390, of which $19,143,685 comes from the
property tax. CITy OF FORT WORTH, supra note 34, at 2.
75. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
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reflected in a price increase. As long as the firm has market power
vis-a-vis its competitors, it will not suffer a significant adverse effect
from a unilateral increase in its costs. The real cost of providing the
governmental service - education - will be passed on to the firm's
consumers. Moreover, these customers will very often reside outside
the school district. 6 For example, if the firm happens to be an oil
or natural gas company, it will export the tax to consumers throughout the country who will bear the cost of that district's education.7"
Simply because of happenstance, a school district with a "golden"
industry is able to provide its children with exceptional educational
opportunity with little sacrifice, while a neighboring school district
without similar good fortune struggles to provide even minimal
educational opportunity.
Andrews County, Texas, is an example of the wealthy district.
Per capita expenditures are among the highest in the state, 78 whereas
the effective valuation rate is among the lowest.79 Utilizing a relatively
low percentage of true market value for tax assessment, Andrews County
provides amazingly high levels of school service. Andrews can accomplish this because it actually sits on an oil field. Moreover, the largest
taxpayers in the county, oil companies, ° seem willing to pay a relatively
high, absolute amount of property taxes in order to retain the good
will of the community and to attract qualified workers by offering
exceptional educational facilities for their children.
Backward shifting occurs where an industry is without power to
raise prices and, in order to meet the additional expense of a tax
increase, is forced to reduce its costs.8" Workers may be willing to
accept lower wages to retain their jobs, or the firm may be able to
reduce overhead in some other fashion. If these events occur, the tax
has been shifted backward. Rather than risk the loss of business and
the concurrent diminution of tax base and jobs, local districts with
comparatively weak businesses may refrain from increasing taxes
and thus be unable to finance quality education. Such a situation is
especially likely if the district also has poorer residential areas.
76. C. MCCONNELL, supra note 60, at 412-15. Demand elasticity is basic to the
concept of market power. To have substantial control over price, the firm must sell
a product whose demand is relatively constant regardless of price increases, i.e.,
usually a "necessary" with few close substitutes. Id.
A

77. CABINET TASK FORCE ON OIL IMPORT CONTROL, THE OIL IMPORT QUESTION:
REPORT ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF OIL IMPORTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY

§ 207c (1970).
78. TEA REPORT, supra note 24, at 4.
79. C. BARTLETT, supra note 24, at App. C.
80. Over 70 per cent of the taxable property in Andrews County is oil and gas.
TAXABLE PROPERTY VALUES, supra note 55, at 142.

81.

C. MCCONNELL,

supra note 60, at 584.
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Residential Districts

A district composed primarily of residential areas will itself bear
the cost of education. Owner-occupants of residential housing simply
lack the ability to shift the tax. However, owners of rental housing
more nearly approximate owners of businesses. If the demand for
rental housing is relatively inelastic with respect to increases in rent,
the tax can easily be passed along. But, if demand for housing declines
faster than price increases, the owner must absorb the tax or risk
further shrinkage of his market.
If the local district is fortunate enough to be composed of relatively
wealthy residential areas, it will probably have good schools. Often
the wealthier residential districts have better schools with higher per
capita expenditures than poorer districts and at lower effective tax
rates.8 2 To reiterate, the quality of education is often determined
not by the willingness of local residents to make economic sacrifices
through higher tax rates, but by relative wealth.
2.

Education and Local Support by the
Property Tax

Since education is a social service with significant spillover and
because it is important to creating real equality of opportunity, most
would agree that it should be made available to all children impartially.
However, great disparities in local expenditures do exist, and, instead
of educational need, the amount of expenditures for education often
turns on the economic composition of the local district. Those districts
having wealthy residential areas or prosperous industries capable of
exporting the tax possess the potential to have quality education; those
districts with little or no industry and poor residential areas do not.
Since education is such an important social service with substantial
spillover, it is submitted that it demands greater state participation and
less reliance on the local property tax, even when used only as a
supplementary or enrichment device. The property tax seriously violates the internal equity concept because it can be shifted easily in
many situations.
C. Regressivity
An important consideration in evaluating any tax in terms of
equity is its regressivity. The property tax has been described as the
"most important regressive element in the tax structure,"8 " and its
82. See note 24 supra.
83.

TAX

FOUNDATION,

INC.,

EXPENDITURES BY INCOME CLASS,

TAX

1961

BURDENS

AND

AND

BENEFITS

OF

1965, at 16 (1967).

GOVERNMENTAL

This regressive
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regressivity described as being "probably greater than that for any
other major tax."8 4 When the property tax is used as a source of
general revenue and not as a form of user charge, it finances a range
of social services that should be supported by broad based taxes levied
on an ability to pay formula. Instead of taxing more heavily the
relatively wealthy, the property tax falls hardest on lower income
groups. However, this regressivity is mitigated by patterns of governmental expenditures. Expenditures such as public housing and welfare,
often financed by local property taxes, confer the greatest benefits on
poorer groups. One commentator has concluded that "[i]n all cases
the impact [of the tax] is markedly progressive: the benefits are
substantially larger percentages of the income of lower groups than of
higher income groups." 85
D.

Resource Allocation

Neutrality, another traditional criterion for evaluating a tax, describes how the tax affects resource allocation. Ideally, after imposition
of the tax, the pattern of allocation should be substantially similar
to the pre-tax spending pattern. Two separate considerations emerge
as significant subdivisions of this broader concept of neutrality. The
first is the effect of the property tax on resource allocation in general,
and the second is its effect on locational decisions of businesses.
1.

General Effects

On a theoretical level, an unshifted property tax tends to increase
the cost of capital by nearly the full extent of the levy and to stimulate
a set of adjustments until a new equilibrium is reached. For example,
a four per cent tax on half the economy's assets is eventually translated
into a two per cent tax on all assets. The cost of the taxed assets has
increased so that their return (interest rate) falls to offset the tax.
Investment then gravitates to untaxed areas bidding their prices up,
until a new equilibrium is reached. The "extra-market" cost of the
property tax has altered investment decisions and the pattern of
resource allocation. To the degree expenditures move to the untaxed
assets, the neutrality principle is violated.86
aspect of the property tax has increased political pressure for tax relief for certain

low-income groups. See note 57 supra.
84. D. NETZER, ECONOMICS

OF THE PROPERTY TAX 59

(1966).

85. Id. at 60.
86. This generalized analysis of the property tax's effect on resource allocation
traces the broad outlines of that presented by Professor Procter Thomson. Thomson,

The Property Tax and the Rate of Interest, in G. BENSON, THE AMERICAN PROPERTY
TAX: ITS HISTORY, ADMINISTRATION, AND ECONOMIC IMPACT (1965).
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The property tax should be criticized only if it results in more
serious distortions than alternative taxes. However, either a proportional income tax or a consumption tax, both broader based taxes,
should produce less distortion. Professor Thomsen estimates that in
1964, to yield revenue of $92.6 billion, the income tax rate would have
been 20 per cent, the sales tax rate 22 per cent, and the property tax
rate 60-80 per cent. 7 Since the property tax has the narrowest base,
it results in greater allocative distortions. Expenditure patterns will
be more drastically altered if a relatively few items become much more
expensive than if all items become slightly more expensive. Since the
property tax has a narrower base and greater distortive effects, it is an
inferior source of revenue from the standpoint of neutrality when
compared to an income or sales tax.
A corollary to the problem of the scope of the tax base is the
more concrete proposition that the property tax is unneutral because
it does not fall equally on all industries. Since property tax rates are
typically higher for realty than personaltyS and since human capital
is untaxed, labor-intensive industries become relatively more profitable
when compared to manufacturing, agriculture, and mining. However,
it is probable that higher payrolls, with their payroll taxes, and the
higher productivity of capital, offset the property tax advantage reaped
by labor-intensive industries.
Even though inter-industry distortions can be mitigated by productivity increases of capital, intra-industry distortions still persist.
One commentator has noted the occurrence of this phenomenon within
the transportation industry. In 1957, the inherently capital-intensive
railroads paid 3.4 per cent of operating revenue in property taxes,
while motor carriers paid only 0.4 per cent and air carriers only 0.2
per cent. 9 The property tax appears to have hastened the decline of
the railroads' competitive position.
2.

Locational Effects

Since World War II, many states have actively pursued tax policies
designed to attract new industries with additional jobs.9" Property
87. Id. at 124. This assumes that the various taxes are the sole source of revenue
and are computed by determining the necessary rate to be applied to a set base all income, all sales, or all assessed property.
88. See D. NETZER, supra note 84, at 140-55.
89. Id. at 73.
90. Whether or not the new industries actually increase the tax base is questionable. The tax concessions may more than offset the additional valuations. See
Ross, Louisiana's Industrial Tax Exemption Program, 15 LA. Bus. BULL. 46 (1953).
See also Stober & Falk, Property Tax Exemption: An Inefficient Subsidy to Industry,
20 NAT'L TAX J. 386 (1967).
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tax exemptions have played a major role in this intergovernmental
warfare because of the preeminent position of the tax in local government finance.91 These exemptions have taken both legislative and
administrative forms. Thirteen states92 specifically authorize local governments to exempt certain "new" industries from local property taxes
for a specified period of years. Several states, including Texas,9" have
enacted "freeport" laws exempting business inventories intended for
out-of-state sale from taxation. In less formal ways, local governments
have sought new industry by negotiating administrative "understand94
ings" to undervalue a business' tax base.
a.

Regional Decisions

The nature and economic position of a particular industry shape
its view of the importance of tax concessions in its choice of location.
Obviously, property tax rates will bear most heavily on capital-intensive
industries. Since a local firm in vigorous national or regional competition cannot unilaterally raise prices and pass the tax forward,
differential rates play a larger role in its decision than in those of
national industries with market power. The result is that, over time,
the competitive local industry will feel increasing pressure to relocate
or to expand where the tax climate is more favorable. Even though
state and local taxes represent a relatively small portion of business
costs, differentials may well be determinative of locations at the margin.
Choices among regions will most likely depend on factors such
as access to resources, quality and composition of the labor supply, and
the local level of public services. The results of one survey9 5 ranked
the following considerations ahead of state-local tax concessions: community attitude toward industry, good employer-employee relations,
productivity of workers, political calm and stability, and educational
91. Although Texas does not permit its localities to use industrial tax bonds, the
utilization of this form of property tax subsidy to industry, as it occurs in other states,
offers valuable lessons concerning the effects of property tax subsidies to industry.
Certain states permit localities to issue general obligation bonds to purchase industrial
facilities which are then leased to private firms in order to attract industry to their
areas. See A. RABINOWITZ,supra note 56, at 101-16. Competition among localities in
offering this form of subsidy often leads, however, to a misallocation of resources,
both in terms of location of industry and preservation of the integrity of local tax
See ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT BOND FINANCING (1963)
[hereinafter cited as BOND FINANCING].
92. For a collection of these exemption statutes, see ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
bases.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL

RELATIONS,

STATE-LOCAL TAXATION AND INDUSTRIAL LOCATION

109-10 (1967) [hereinafter cited as STATE-LOCAL TAXATION].
93. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 7150f (Supp. 1972).
94. "While the extent of this 'bargaining table' approach to property tax assessment cannot be documented, its existence cannot be denied." STATE-LOCAL TAXATION,
supra note 92, at 48. No doubt, local assessors are reluctant to admit publicly intentional underassessment.
95. Id. at 74-76.
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opportunity. Another study96 ranked labor relations and extent of
unionization ahead of tax concessions. Undoubtedly, these other
factors are most important in comparing one region to another where
relative conditions may differ substantially. But when the choice is
narrowed to urban or suburban sites in the same area, the property
tax assumes a larger role.
b.

Urban-Suburban Decisions

When the locational choice is between urban and suburban sites,
the cities tend to lose because of their higher property tax rates and
because other cost factors tend to become constant. Although the migration to the suburbs by businesses and homeowners results from many
forces, the property tax probably reinforces the trend. 7 Whatever the
reasons, as businesses and homeowners make the move, central cities
lose their tax base. The declining base, coupled with the increasing
demand for public services for the lower income groups remaining in
the core of the urban centers, drives rates up.
Fiscal warfare among locally competing jurisdictions has reinforced the forces encouraging moves to the suburbs. The results of
the moves are economic dislocations, high effective tax rates, and a
mismatching of needs and resources. One commentator has succinctly
described the potential for misallocation:
To the extent that firms are influenced by tax factors, a species
of Gresham's Law operates: these firms will tend to gravitate to
low tax cost areas. If these low taxes arise from actual economies
in the provision of public services, the tax factor reflects a real
economic factor and its influence does not distort location from
the sites which are most economic. But if this is not the case,
tax influences do exercise an undesirable influence by leading firms
to locate in places other than those which involve maximum
efficiency in the use of resources. s
96. For a summary of the findings of a 1963 study conducted by the Bureau of
Business Research, University of South Carolina, see Alyea, Property Tax Induceinents to Attract Industry, in PROPERTY TAXATION USA 139, 150 (R. Lindholm
ed. 1969).
97. The forces making for decentralization are so potent that it can be confidently asserted that the tide would not have been stemmed even had there been
large property tax differentials in favor of the central cities. In fact, the decentralization process seems to have proceeded no less rapidly in those few areas in
which the central city does appear to have an advantage in effective tax rates.
Nevertheless, if tax differentials against the central city are widening, which is
a distinct possibility at the present time, the likelihood increases that local fiscal
arrangements will have an un-neutral locational effect: that businesses and residents who might otherwise have preferred a central city location will choose
instead a location in outer portions of the metropolitan areas.
D. NETZER, supra note 84, at 123.
98. Due, Studies of State-Local Tax Influences on Location of Industry, 14 NAT'L
TAX J. 163 (1961).
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Although the general distortive effects are hard to document, mismatching of the need for governmental services with potential revenue
is more apparent. The central cities, with the greatest need for revenue
to meet the needs of the urban poor, lack an adequate tax base.
Moreover, the more wealthy suburbs, who least need quality services,
finance better services at lower effective rates."
E. An Example
Even though many of the economic effects described in this
section are theoretical and difficult to prove, the most serious evil
can be easily illustrated. That evil is the inherent propensity to separate
needs from resources by reliance on the local property tax to finance
those social services with significant spillover, such as education, welfare, public housing, and health. This mismatching is most severe in
large urban centers.
1.

The Rich District

Ector County, Texas, exemplifies the school district having the
ability to provide a high level of educational service with relatively
little tax effort by its residents. It spends annually $543 per pupil,'
seventh among the thirty-nine comparably sized districts within the
state. The average expenditure for all districts is $504,"' and for
Ector's group, $469.1"2 Ector's expenditures are misleading, however,
when compared to the statewide average because larger school districts
reach certain economies of scale which return more service per dollar;
of the twelve size classifications created by the Texas Education Agency,
Ector falls with the second largest,"0 3 and thus is capable of taking
advantage of such economies.
The distribution of property classifications within Ector's tax
base is as follows: commercial and industrial, 5.9 per cent; single
family houses, 18.8 per cent; and "others," 72.0 per cent.'0 4 The
"other" category represents primarily oil and gas valuations. The
various rates imposed on each of the categories are the following:
99. Netzer presents data indicating the greater ability of wealthy suburbs to

finance services. Moreover, "richer communities in property value terms can indulge
their tastes for more and better public goods at lower, not higher, tax rates since tax
rates decline rapidly as property values rise." D. NETZER, supra note 84, at 126.
100. TEA REPORT, supra note 24, at 2.
101. Id. at 1.
102. Id. at 13.
103. Ector County is coextensive with the independent school district. It has
23,034 students placing it in Group II, the 10,000-49,999 average daily attendance group.

Id. at 1.
104. TAXABLE

PROPERTY VALUES,
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residences, 24 per cent; oil and gas, 35 per cent; and commercial, 31
per cent.1"' A few important conclusions emerge from examination
of these figures. First, the bulk of the school support comes from the
"other" category - oil and gas assessments. Besides being by far the
largest component of the tax base, oil and gas is assessed at the highest
rate. Secondly, residences, a relatively small portion of the total tax
base, are assessed at the lowest rate. The residents have avoided the
full impact of the tax due to the presence of the oil companies.
The frequently quoted and usually self-serving justification offered
for maintaining local support of education through the property tax
is the importance of local autonomy, with its corollary that those
districts which really value education will choose high tax rates. But
the 30 per cent actual assessment ratio" 6 of Ector belies the real
burden borne by the immediate users of education, resident property
owners.'
The residents are not making an economic sacrifice to
provide good schools; they are relying on the oil companies to do it
for them.
The real cost of education is being exported from Ector via sales
of oil and natural gas. Just as consumers of Detroit-made automobiles
pay a portion of General Motors' local property taxes, non-Texas
consumers of petroleum products pay the oil companies' taxes. To
the extent that property taxes exceed the cost of supplying businessrelated services, such as fire and police protection and water and
sewerage service, non-local consumers subsidize local governments.
The result is a series of hidden transfer payments that make it
virtually impossible to find where the real tax burden lies.
Should a locality be blessed with a "golden" industry, it has the
potential to tax that industry to the brink of its competitive position.
The locality's position is even more appealing if the industry is a
captive one,' ° such as oil or lumbering that cannot relocate. If such
local districts were responsible for providing public housing, health,
and welfare services, they might well be able to build high rise public
housing and provide the members of the community with early retire105. C. BARTLETT, supra note 24, at App. C.
106. Id.
107. "Resident" property owners in this context refers to owners of residential
property. Such property owners actually receive a double benefit in the sense that
many of these residential families will send their own children to school and will pay
no more than a fraction of the cost of their less fortunate counterparts in districts not
blessed with the presence of oil companies.
108. In the case of Ector County, since the tax base is largely composed of a nonmovable asset such as oil, the businesses paying the tax bill cannot easily threaten
to relocate, as other "golden" industries might, in order to hold taxes down. Rather,
these companies must pay the designated rate, whether excessive or not, constrained
only by whatever political pressures can be brought to bear on local authorities.
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ments, all at the expense of the oil companies and, ultimately, their
consumers.

2.

The Poor District

The Mesquite school district's ability to support education is in
marked contrast to that of the rich district. Mesquite falls within the
same student population group as Ector and should encounter similar
economies of scale for its expenditures. Although the exact composition of Mesquite's tax base is not known because such figures
are reported only for the county unit, its tax assessment ratios speak for
themselves. Mesquite's actual ratio is 78 per cent compared to Ector's
30 per cent."°9 Commercial and industrial property is assessed at 56
per cent of true market value; business personalty at 60 per cent;
and residences at 81 per cent.'
Despite these high rates, Mesquite
spends only $373 per pupil, approximately 68 per cent of what Ector
spends and almost $100 below the average for its group."' Mesquite
apparently lacks rich oil and gas properties and other suitable industries
2
to finance its education so that the burden is left to local homeowners.1
Reliance on the property tax to finance education predestines
Mesquite's school children to inferior educational opportunity as compared to students in Ector. The local effort justification is particularly
unpersuasive in this kind of situation since Ector achieves higher per
capita expenditures with lower actual assessment ratios. Here, as in
many cases, neither need nor local effort determines the quality of
the governmental services; instead, the criteria are wealth and chance.
The property tax is justifiable as a source of local revenue when it
is limited to the financing of those services that tend to benefit
individuals through their use of property. But, it cannot be justified
as a source of general revenue to finance social services with significant
spillover. It results in a mismatching of needs to resources and permits
the beneficiaries of services to shift payment to others.

III.

DEVELOPING LEGAL APPROACHES AND
THEIR

CONSEQUENCES

To this point, this Article has shown that reliance on the local
property tax to support services leads to an inevitable mismatching
109. TEA REPORT, supra note 24, at 5.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Mesquite's only opportunity to increase revenue substantially is to attract
industry; yet to attract industry, Mesquite probably must reduce taxes and suffer a
dccline in already underfinanced services. Under present conditions, then, Mesquite,
as well as other cities and school districts in the same predicament, must simply suffer
with the problem.
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of needs and resources. Therefore, it is necessary to examine next
the context in which this problem of the mismatching has arisen and
how the action taken by the courts has affected it.
A.

Attempts to Deal with the Problem of Disparities

Disparities in local and state services due to the mismatching of
needs and resources have been the subject of three important recent
cases: Serrano v. Priest,"' Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent
School District,"' and Hawkins v. Town of Shaw."' In each of these
cases the courts addressed the disparities in governmental services;
each dealt with taxing patterns only indirectly. Serrano and Rodriguez
raise the problem of disparities in expenditures among residents of
the whole state, whereas Shaw concerns disparities among residents of
a single town.
In Serrano,plaintiffs' basic contention was that their children were
being denied equal protection of the laws because the method of
financing public education used by California inevitably resulted in
lower per pupil expenditures in those areas populated by the poor."'
Reliance upon the local property tax, plaintiffs claimed, constituted an
invidious discrimination in the provision of a fundamental service based
on classification by wealth. They were able to show substantial disparities in per student expenditures with higher amounts being spent
in those areas with higher assessed valuations - generally, those areas
where the relatively wealthy lived.' 1 7
The California Supreme Court was receptive to plaintiffs' attempts
to construct their argument within the framework of established equal
protection doctrine. Since the court purported to decide the case on
both fourteenth amendment and parallel state constitutional grounds,
it began by classifying the nature of the child's interest in education.
Unable to find direct authority for the proposition that education is a
fundamental interest, the court, nevertheless, concluded that education
is such an interest, thus requiring application of the "compelling state
interest" standard of equal protection."' The court concluded that
113.
114.
115.
116.

5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1972), rev'd, 93 S. Ct. 1278 (1973).
437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971).
5 Cal. 3d at 589-91, 487 P.2d at 1244-45, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604-05.
117. Id. at 612, 487 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
118. Although Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was not held to
be controlling on the issue of whether or not public education is a fundamental interest,
the Serrano court quoted approvingly from the Supreme Court's description of the
importance of education. In Brown, the Court declared:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public respon-
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education is so vital to an individual's chance to be socially and economically successful that it must be considered fundamental.' 9 Neither
the alleged need for local control and autonomy in school operation nor
its corollary, the need for local finance, was found to be such a compelling state interest as to justify the disparities. The court, therefore,
found the financing system unconstiutional as a denial of equal
protection.
The lower court in Rodriguez followed the lead of the California
Supreme Court and found the Texas method of financing education in
violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2 '
Plaintiffs' contentions were essentially the same as those made in
Serrano - that the quality of education that the child received was
a function of the wealth of his parents and of the school district in
which he resided. The Rodriguez plaintiffs also were able to show
substantial disparities in per pupil expenditures among school districts.' ' Applying the compelling state interest standard, because
it likewise found education to be a fundamental interest, the threejudge federal court held that the quality of public education may not be
a function of wealth, other than the wealth of the state as a whole.' 2
The Shaw case presents a different problem. Shaw, Mississippi,
was a small town composed of approximately 1500 whites and 1000
Negroes. Plaintiffs, Negro citizens of Shaw, alleged racial discrimination in the provision of municipal services violative of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. They indicated that
the predominantly white areas had better sewage systems, better
fire hydrants, better street lighting, more paved streets, and better
water service than the predominantly Negro areas. The majority of
these services were financed from general revenues.'
In reversing the
district court, the Fifth Circuit declared that the proper standard for
sibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to
adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity to

an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it,
it is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
Id. at 493. By relying upon the United States Supreme Court's finding, the California
Supreme Court reveals the methodology of the fundamental interest test. Theoretically, as a result, any state provided or state-authorized service that is sufficiently
"important" either to individuals or to society may be found to be a fundamental
interest.

119. 5 Cal. 3d at 609-11, 487 P.2d at 1258-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618-19. But see
C. JENCKS, INEQUALITY:

IN AMERICA

120.
121.
122.
123.

337
Id.
Id.
437

A

REASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF FAMILY AND SCHOOLING

(1972).
F. Supp. at 284.
at 282.
at 286.
F.2d at 1294 (concurring opinion).
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testing the classification was that of compelling state interest, rather
than the traditional rational basis test, because the classification was
prima facie based on racial discrimination.' 2 4 The Fifth Circuit rejected defendant's claims that the disparities resulted from compelling
nonracial factors, such as commercial need in the paving of streets,
and directed the town to submit a plan to correct the inequities within
12 5
a reasonable time.
1.

The Serrano-Rodriguez Problem

Serrano held that "the right to education in our public schools is
a fundamental interest which cannot be conditioned on wealth."' 26
Similarly, the three-judge panel in Rodriguez held that the state must
adopt a program that does not "make the quality of public education
12
a function of wealth other than the wealth of the state as a whole.'
Even though the Supreme Court has rejected this approach, 2 8 this
fact pattern offers a useful illustration of the problem of eliminating
service disparities that arise from wealth differentials in the local
property tax base. Before examining the available alternatives, it is
to be assumed that equality of educational opportunity does not require
equal per pupil expenditures among school districts, but does require
equal access to financial resources among a state's school districts,
independently of the wealth of any particular locality.
As indicated previously, there are three patterns of adjusting
intergovernmental financial relationships: social equity, incentive matching, and political economy. 29 Although virtually all states utilize
programs falling within one or more of these categories in an attempt
to ameliorate imbalances in the local wealth of their subdivisions, these
efforts continue to leave wide variations in per pupil expenditures.!"0
Since the incentive matching approach is not designed to alleviate
interdistrict wealth disparities,'
there is little point in evaluating its
suitability for financing public schools. At the same time, there can
be no question that interdistrict wealth disparities would be alleviated
by the social equity approach, under which the state would determine
"the level of performance or the money outlay per unit of need with
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 1288.
Id. at 1293.
5 Cal. 3d at 590, 487 P.2d at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
337 F. Supp. at 284.
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. 1278 (1973).
See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
See text accompanying notes 100-12 supra.
D. MORGAN & F. HAYDEN, supra note 27, at 25-35.
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performance or outlay both equalized among the districts.'

3

2

Simply

stated, the state would function as a single school district for the
limited purpose of collecting and dispensing revenue; yet, it could
continue to delegate to local districts many of the same functions now
performed by these districts. A critical but unanswered question
revolves around whether the political economy approach - which
requires "equalization by the state of fiscal potential among the
constituent school districts, with district determination of outlay per
unit of need ' 133 - can eliminate interdistrict wealth differentials as
the determining factor in the relative availability of services. In other
words, through the use of one of several tax redistribution formalae,
the state would equalize the revenue-raising potential of all of its
districts, thereby making educational expenditures a function of local
tax effort. Under this approach, each district would, to a greater or
lesser degree, be left free to decide for itself how much it wants to
spend on education.
An analysis of the political economy approach and its variants
must focus on whether, if utilized, it is possible to achieve "fiscal
neutrality"' 3 4 - the elimination of district wealth as a factor in the
availability of resources for education. Although many different proposals 35 concerning use of local sales and income taxes are being
suggested, these alternatives mark a step forward only in that more
broadly based taxes are used to finance a social service with extralocal
impact. Use of these tax bases, even with equalization factors, will
not necessarily dissolve interdistrict wealth disparities as determinants
of the quality of local education. No attempt will be made here to
discuss these alternatives as replacements for the local property tax
because they presently play only a marginal role in educational finance,
and no significant move in their direction appears likely. Instead,
analysis of two basic patterns of application of the political economy
theory will serve as the basis for evaluating the possibility of divorcing
the local property tax from district wealth differentials.
First, local districts could be redrawn in such a way as to equalize
the ratio of average daily attendance to property tax base, while leaving
132. Id. at 12.
133. Id.
134. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 284
(W.D. Tex. 1972).
135. For a thorough discussion of the potential use of tax bases other than the
property tax in local government finance, see Due, Alternative Tax Sources for
Education, in ECONoMIc FACTORS AFFECTING THE FINANCING OF EDUCATION 291-328
(R. Johns ed. 1970). See also SIGNIFICANT FEATURES, supra note 4, at 68; Schaefer,

Sales Tax Regressivity Under Alternative Tax Bases and Income Concepts, 22

NAT'L

TAX J. 516 (1969).
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the present administrative districts intact. Theoretically then, for a
given tax rate, the same revenue would be available for all taxing
regions and districts. This approach, nonetheless, would not eliminate
wealth factors from denying all districts equal access to financial resources. Even though the equalized tax bases would be numerically
equal, they would not necessarily possess the same taxpaying ability.
So long as taxpaying ability, a function of economic wealth, is unequal,
so also will be the services dependent on it. Although numerically in
parity, the composition of these various equalized tax bases will result
in varying degrees of tax strain among the individual regions.'

As previously noted, the ease of paying the property tax cannot
7
be accurately measured because of existing methods of assessment .
For example, businesses, which constitute a large share of the property
tax base, do not all earn the same return on capital. Some have a
measure of market power and are able to shift the tax forward and
export it from the jurisdiction; others are unable to shift it. Obviously,
the tax burden for those who cannot shift it will be much heavier.
The impossibility of identifying those businesses and the fact that they
can not be equitably distributed among taxing regions point to the
futility of this method. Moreover, other factors contribute to this
futility. Although, in the abstract, education is a social service which
benefits all of society, some perceive more immediate benefits than
others and arrange their financial decisions accordingly. For example,
at an elemental level, retired citizens and childless couples owning considerable realty are not as likely to be interested in quality education
supported by a property tax as poor families owning little real estate
with many school-age children.

Depending upon the incidence of

these groups within a given taxing region, economic judgments related
136. "Tax strain" as used herein is a different concept from "tax effort." A recent
revenue-sharing bill, H.R. 11950, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 104 (1972), illustrates one
method of computing tax effort. Under that proposed formula, a state's tax effort
would be determined by dividing total state and local revenue by total personal income.
Tax strain, however, is broader and encompasses tax effort, tax incidence
(whether the tax is shifted forward or backward), and marginal utility (taxpayer
perceptions of the benefits of governmental programs in exchange for loss of income
available to purchase private goods). High tax effort, as a result, may or may not
indicate intense tax strain. It is the elusive nature of tax strain as a working concept
and the inadequacy of tax effort as a realistic means of measuring taxpaying ability
among various political subdivisions that point to the futility of achieving "fiscal
neutrality" through tax equalization schemes. Since tax strain cannot be quantified,
if all political subdivisions of a state are to have equal access to financial resources,
the state must provide the financing itself. For a comprehensive analysis of taxpayerinvoked constraints on certain public expenditures based on similar considerations of
intense tax strain, see Buchanan, Taxpayer Constraints on Financing Education, in
ECONOMIC FACTORS AFFECTING THE FINANCING OF EDUCATION 265 (R. Johns ed. 1970).
137. Since all capital does not yield the same return, relative property values, or
the amount of capital involved in a particular business, bears little relationship to
taxpaying ability of one business as compared with another. See text accompanying
notes 76-81 supra.
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to relative wealth and taxpaying ability will continue to create disparities
in the level of education among different geographic areas of the state.
A second method of effecting equality of access to financial resources for education in all districts via the political economy approach
is quite appealing, but no more helpful in eliminating wealth factors.
In their original article on this subject, Clune, Coons, and Sugarman
suggested "power equalization" as a device for making the local quality
of education a function of tax effort, not wealth."' Tax effort ind
wealth, however, are inseparable concepts. A simple illustration will
show the mechanics of power equalization which equalizes tax effort.8 9
The example posits two equally populated school districts, composed
only of residential property. In District A, homes average $15,000
and incomes $7500 per family; in District B, homes average $30,000
and incomes $15,000 per family. A tax levied at a rate of twenty
mills will give each district $450 per unit of average daily attendance.
At this point each district enjoys equal expenditures per unit through
a power-equalized proportional tax. But since power equalization
permits each district to decide for itself how much education it wants,
any resulting disparities must be scrutinized to determine whether
they are functions of wealth.
THE WEAKNESS OF THE POWER EQUALIZATION

MODEL

District A
District B
(figures in dollars)
Average Income
Average Property Values
Tax at 20 Mills
Power Equalization Factor

7,500
15,000
300

15,000
30,000
600
300 + 600
2

Power Equalized Unit Expenditure for Each District
After Tax Average Disposable
Income
7,200
Tax at 30 Mills
450
Power Equalized Unit Expenditure for Each District
After Tax Average Disposable
Income
7,050
Cost of Increased Expenditure over
Initial 20-Mill Levy
150 for 225

14,400
900

14,100
300 for 225

138. Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 305 (1969).
139. See Table, at 558.
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Economic factors indicate that District A is likely to spend less
than District B per unit of educational benefit. If each decides to increase its taxes from twenty to thirty mills, each can spend $675 per
average daily attendance unit. To do so, however, families in A must
reduce their disposable income by $150 to $7050, and families in B
must reduce theirs from $14,400 to $14,100. In other words, families
in A are buying $225 in increased expenditures per unit for $150,
while families in B are buying the same increase for $300. However,
in terms of real sacrifice, every dollar taken from the poorer families
in District A "hurts" much more than each dollar taken from families
in District B, since a proportional tax falls more heavily on the poor
than the relatively more wealthy.14 °
What originally seemed to motivate court action in California
and Texas was not so much interdistrict tax disparities as interdistrict service disparities arising from wealth variations. Although
power equalization attempts to neutralize variations in district wealth,
it only reduces wealth as a contributing factor. Therefore, even if
the Supreme Court had affirmed Rodriguez, a literal reading of "fiscal
neutrality" would disallow differentials in local spending based upon
variations in local desires because such desires for education would
inevitably be influenced by the relative wealth of each district.
To remove wealth from the equation for providing social services
equally to all residents within a state, some variation of the social equity
approach must be employed. Although it is not within the scope of
this Article to discuss what effect such an approach will have on traditional concepts of local control over education, or any other service,
it is likely that such a program would have much less impact than
imagined.' 4 1 While wealthy school districts might well face reduced
140. So long as local choice concerning definition of unit need is permitted, wealth
variations will affect the amount of economic resources available for a given service.
Taxpayer constraints will inevitably create service disparities as the tax ceiling in
each district is met. See Buchanan, supra note 136, at 267-71. In other words, the
taxpayers, as a corporate body, will perceive either more or less utility from a given

service at the margin. Since a priori judgments of marginal utility for a given
service cannot be quantified for individuals - much less political subdivisions varying degrees of wealth will always result in service disparities regardless of
power equalization.
141. Loss of significant local control of services financed by means of the social
equity approach, in which the state determines need and provides all economic
resources, is by no means inevitable. Various devices do exist for preserving maximum local policy control and administrative flexibility. See Address by Governor

Milliken, supra note 32; Hearings Before the Select Comm. on Equal Educational

Opportunity of the United States Senate, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 6862 (1971)

(remarks

of Professor Yudof). Contra, Brazer, Federal, State, and Local Responsibility for
Financing Education, in ECONOMIc FACTORS AFFECTING THE FINANCING OF EDUCATION
235, 259-60 (R. Johns ed. 1970).
Insofar as education is concerned, cost differentials, or the weighted-student
approach might be utilized to preserve maximum local control. For a brief overview
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choice in expenditure patterns, many of the poorer districts will ex-

perience the opportunity for choice for the first time. In any event,
the genuine need for pluralism and decentralization in the administration
of education can be met by the state dispensing a significant portion
of the resources to each district with no strings attached. Under such
a program, each district would continue to be free to manage its own
programs and to set its own priorities.
Until recently, most judicial activity has focused upon service
level disparities and not on taxes as such. Tax disparities, however,
create similar problems of a reciprocal nature. Referring once again
to the New Jersey method of financing welfare,142 overutilization of
unequalized local tax bases to finance uniform levels of a social service
with significant spillover leads to the converse of Serrano. In fact,
the New Jersey system amounts to what California would encounter if
it sought to comply with Serrano by mandating that each school district
should spend the same amount per pupil, but that the necessary revenues
should be raised solely within the boundaries of each district. The
obvious effect of this practice would be to have tax rates move
inversely to the wealth of the school district.
While courts have become involved with the constraints which
the equal protection clause imposes on the states in discriminating
against some individuals and districts in favor of others, they have
been reluctant to constrain the taxing discretion of legislatures. In
tax matters, the Supreme Court has held that "a classification, though
discriminatory, is not arbitrary nor violative of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if any state of facts reasonably
can be conceived that would sustain it."'' For obvious policy reasons,
great flexibility has been accorded to states in raising revenue.
With this legal framework and the economic realities of the
property tax in mind, the New Jersey pattern of finance can be
evaluated. Under that system, county governments are required to
provide 25 per cent of the total cost of welfare within their respective
of the weighting process, see McLure & Pence, Early Childhood and Basic Elementary
and Secondary Education, in PLANNING TO FINANCE EDUCATION 23-27 (Johns,
Alexander & Jordan eds. 1971). Under this approach, the state would determine the
unit cost of educating various kinds of students, i.e., the physically or mentally handicapped, members of minority groups, urban or rural children, and students in vocational, elementary, or secondary school. After setting a dollar figure for the cost of
educating each such student, the state would then distribute funds to each locality
according to the number of the various kinds of students within the particular school
district. These resources would then be made available to the districts to spend as
they might choose, such as for teachers' salaries, decreases in pupil-teacher ratios,
improved physical facilities, or an expanded curriculum.
142. See notes 13-16 and accompanying text supra.
143. Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528 (1959).
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jurisdictions.4
Although the amount of benefits is standardized
throughout the state, the incidence of welfare recipients per county
varies throughout the state. Thus, since some counties have wealthier
tax bases than others, this system results in substantial variations
of tax rates. Based upon those facts, the constitutionality of the New
Jersey property tax has recently been contested. 45
Moreover, forced interdistrict tax disparities will most likely result
in both interregional and interarea locational effects. When one service
such as welfare, or when one level of government such as the state,
makes exorbitant demands upon a tax base, other governmentally provided services, such as fire and police protection, are certain to suffer.
Furthermore, when those who are relatively more wealthy flee high
tax enclaves leaving the poor behind, the tax base erodes, thereby
driving up rates just to maintain existing service levels. Again, when
the legislature seeks to assist the poor by increasing welfare assistance,
the poor are required to finance a large portion of this very same
assistance.
Other than these problems, a further anomaly exists. The concept
of ability to pay as a means of redistributing income downward plays
an insignificant role in this system. Tax rates vary on a county-bycounty basis. A significant number of poor people will live in counties
in which tax rates are high and therefore pay exaggerated amounts
of taxes to finance welfare; at the same time, a significant number of
wealthy people will live in counties where tax rates are low, and
therefore pay reduced amounts to finance welfare. Thus, income is
not simply redistributed from the wealthy to the poor, but rather is
redistributed from the wealthy to the poor in varying rates depending
upon where the taxpayer happens to reside.
The courts must be prepared to grapple with such economic
factors if satisfactory results are to be achieved in upcoming challenges
to state taxation schemes. Correlation of services and tax bases by
courts and legislatures must be the lode star of analysis if these
challenges are to be manageable. The problem presented by this illustration, then, should not be regarded as a distinct problem, but rather as
one facet of the problem of interdistrict service disparities.
144. See note 13 supra.
145. Bonnet v. Cahill, Civil No. L-3865-72 (Super. Ct. N.J., filed Oct. 11, 1972).
It was argued therein that "[t]he imposing of taxes and the raising of revenues and
its incidence entails a fundamental right of all citizens to fair treatment in defraying
the cost of government." Plaintiff's Complaint, id. It is unlikely that any court would
accept such an argument because it would require the overruling of the Allied Stores
case, cited favorably in Rodriguez, and would involve the judiciary in an unending
determination of which taxes are discriminatory. Cf. 93 S. Ct. at 1302.
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The Shaw Problem

Intradistrict disparities in the level and quality of municipally run
services due to individual wealth variations raise the same economic
issues appearing in Serrano-Rodriguezand novel ones as well. Central
to an understanding of the situation presented by Shaw is the realization
that all governmentally provided services are not within the same
class.146 Some services are provided by or authorized by municipal
governments not because they are governmental or social in nature,
but merely because economies of scale dictate that the locality either
grant private enterprise a monopoly or undertake to provide the
service itself. Utilities are the most notable of this class of services,
but others include public transportation, ambulance service, certain
recreational facilities, and, perhaps, paving of residential streets.47
and street lighting. To the extent that these services are provided
to recipients at less than unit cost, these recipients become the beneficiaries of a form of welfare. It is at this point that the local property
tax becomes important because of its continuing role as the mainstay
of local finance.
If these services are to be guaranteed to recipients independently
of their ability to pay, it is likely that the property tax will be used
to meet the cost differential. For example, if the residents of a particular
locality decide to maintain low water rates by means of subsidizing
a municipally operated water department, this added cost must nevertheless be absorbed in some manner. In such a case, the subsidy will
probably be provided from the property tax revenues. This approach
has the effect of saddling those in geographic proximity to those who
want cheap water, or welfare in kind, with the responsibility for
providing it. Under this approach, ability to pay as a basis for redistribution of income from the wealthy to the poor does not even
enter into the equation. Since the local property tax is the most
likely revenue source to be utilized in providing such a "free" service,
the economic consequences of using this device should be understood.
These economic consequences will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction depending upon the economic composition of the particular
taxing unit. In any event, the cost of living in proximity to poor
146. Since the inquiry in Shaw focused on discrimination based on wealth, service
analysis did not really enter into the majority's thinking. Once racial discrimination
or discrimination based upon wealth is shown, then any disparity in municipally
provided or, perhaps, even municipally franchised (see Ihrke v. Northern States
Power Co., 328 F. Supp. 404 (D. Minn. 1971), rev'd, 429 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1972)),
services can be found to be an "invidious discrimination" in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
147. Texas cities may levy special assessments to pay for street maintenance and
improvements on a frontage fee basis rather than on the market value standard.
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1082 (1963).
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people will inevitably rise. Unfortunately, it is often the marginally
poor, not the wealthy, who live near the poor. 48 In certain situations,
efforts on the part of a municipality to provide welfare in this manner
can produce negative results. Where the residential tax base is composed primarily of low-income housing and little or no business, and
a significant number of welfare recipients live within the jurisdiction
(who cannot afford to pay for their utilities but who have the political
power to compel the city to finance these services via the property
tax instead of through user fees), these recipients of "free" services
will become the beneficiaries of property tax payments made by homeowners within the community. It should be noted, however, that to
the extent these recipients experience rent increases due to this new
burden on the property tax, this added cost must be deducted to
calculate the net gratuitous benefit. As a result of this approach, the
poor finance a portion of the "free" services, while the marginally poor
are compelled to pay for the rest.
Income is redistributed progressively if a community is blessed
with a "golden" industry. Since these industries possess the power
to shift the increased tax forward and export it from the taxing jurisdiction onto consumers elsewhere, a community with such an industry
has resources within its boundaries for substantial welfare in kind.
The limit on these resources will be reached when the taxes absorb
whatever market power the industry possesses. Again serving as a
good example of such a district is Ector County, Texas, in which oil
and gas constitute over 70 per cent of the property tax base. 4 9 Since
the county meets its present needs through relatively low assessment
ratios, it has tremendous financial potential for financing services
through the local property tax. If, for instance, Ector taxed at the
same rate as its less fortunate neighbor, Mesquite, its citizens could
enjoy an extensive range of public services financed largely by consumers of oil and gas.
Of course, these two examples are extreme. Most districts fall
somewhere in between. Nevertheless, the level and quality of "free"
services will be a function of the taxpaying ability of a given community weighed against its desire for particular services. In this re
spect, the property tax has an effective ceiling only when voting
property owners decide that they get more utility from private services
than tax-supported services, and, based on this perception, refuse to
permit increased taxation. Since this ceiling will vary among taxing
units, both tax and service differentials will develop. As previously
148. STATE AID

TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT,

supra note 26, at 67-69.

149. See notes 100-12 and accompanying text .supra.
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noted, such differentials can lead to disaster for certain communities
by forcing industries operating at a low margin of profit to relocate
in order to avoid high taxation, and by inducing the relatively wealthy
residents to flee to jurisdictions with fewer poor people and lower
tax burdens.'
Compelling cities to provide private municipal services to their
residents, independent of the individual's ability to pay, as in Shaw,
or even permitting cities to undertake this responsibility if they choose
through normal political processes, can only lead to tax and service
differentials with concomitant dysfunctional economic effects. In short,
after local attempts to provide welfare in cash or in kind, the poor
will remain poor, the marginally poor will become poorer, and those
individuals and industries able to flee high tax enclaves will do so,
leaving behind a situation worse than if nothing had been done.' 51
All of this is not to say that nothing can or should be done; rather,
in terms of providing welfare and education, nothing can or should be
done locally. Local unequal tax bases cannot provide equal social
programs with extralocal impact. Disguising welfare payments by
providing what are essentially private services independently of the
recipient's ability to pay only exacerbates tax and service inequities.
Needs and resources are inevitably mismatched.
Still, state government must be accorded flexibility in meeting
the needs of its citizens. Certainly, a state should, if it chooses, be
permitted to provide welfare in kind to its needy citizens, so long
as it provides those services equally throughout its jurisdiction. However, under existing constitutional doctrine, a state has no affirmative
responsibility to provide welfare at all. For a state to attempt such
a task by making available whatever municipal services that a court or
legislature might consider "fundamental" would be policy madness.
How much water, sewage, street paving, bus fare, garbage collection,
street lighting, recreational facilities, and so forth must the state,
through the local governmental unit provide to the indigent? These decisions for nonindigent consumers are made with relative ease because
they set their own financial priorities and then buy what they can afford.
GOVERNMENT, supra note 26, at 69-70.
151. This problem is most acute in the populous cities of the East where property
taxes are among the highest in the country. Cf. note 55 supra. The futility in trying
to furnish services that many jurisdictions cannot afford prompted President Nixon
to offer revenue-sharing legislation. In pinpointing the pressures on state and local
leaders resulting from tax limitations and service demands, the President stated:
[T]hey [state and local leaders] must cut services or raise taxes to avoid
bankruptcy. . . . [T]he problems they face and the public they serve demand
expanded programs and lower cost. Competition between taxing jurisdictions
for industry and for residents adds further pressures to keep services up and
taxes down.
H.R. Doc. No. 92-44, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1971).

150. STATE AID TO LOCAL
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On what possible basis can government decide how much of each of
these services it must provide for indigents? What are minimal or
subsistence levels of each of these services? Moreover, just as with
education, the only way that ensuing interdistrict disparities in these
services could be remedied would be through some form of the social
equity approach by which the state, not the locality, determines need
and pays the cost. Such an effort would result in centralized bureaucratic decisionmaking on an unimagined scale.152
B.
1.

Legal Rationales

The Compelling Interest Standard and Its Problems

Serrano, Rodriguez, and Shaw represent the latest manifestation
of a relatively new aspect of the equal protection doctrine. In the
last thirty years, the equal protection clause has developed a more
53
stringent test for evaluating certain kinds of governmental action.
The traditional equal protection standard considered only whether the
questioned classification was rationally related to a legitimate government policy.'
The newer test, however, requires the state to show
a compelling state interest to justify certain legislative classifications
when those classifications touch certain fundamental rights or are
based on suspect criteria.'5 5 Suspect classifications include race, 5 6
152. Although the most appropriate means for providing welfare, or redistributing
income downward, is not the main focus of this study, efficiency in the allocation of
resources for providing various public services is relevant to this analysis. Once
a service is defined to be a "fundamental interest," or one that must be made available
to all regardless of ability to pay, some mode of deciding the extent to which that
particular service should be provided to the poor must be developed. In this respect,
bureaucratic decisions concerning the needs of the poor are likely to control if in-kind
disbursements, rather than cash transfers, are to be made. Cash disbursements would
preserve the natural control elements of the market place by permitting indigents to
choose for themselves what they want and do not want, while at the same time
providing an income floor at the subsistence level.
If welfare is to be provided, cash, or some form of a voucher system for
in-kind disbursals, would appear preferable to furnishing in-kind services. However,
if municipal services are to be provided to the poor irrespective of the individual ability
to pay, then the bureaucracy necessary to achieve these goals would quite likely lead
to inefficiency and establish a vested interest for providing more and more "unneeded"
services, since bureaucratic strategies in the budgetmaking process can be expected to
reflect more the needs of a healthy bureaucracy than an objective assessment of the
needs of the service recipients.

A.

WILDAVSKY, THE

POLITICS

OF THE BUDGETARY

PROCESS 21-31 (1964).
153. See generally Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949) ; Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARV.
L. REV. 1065 (1969).

154. The traditional test is used primarily to evaluate state regulation of economic
activity. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Railway Express
Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
155. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). A clear expression of
the newer doctrine is provided in Justice Harlan's dissent. Id. at 658. See also 36
Mo. L. REV. 117 (1971), in which the author finds three classifications - the traditional
rational basis test for economic regulations, an intermediate compelling interest test
for fundamental rights, and a legitimate overriding purpose test for racial classifications.
156. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
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wealth, 157 and, possibly, any distinction based on the exercise of a
constitutional right. 5 Fundamental rights have included voting,'59
indigents' rights to counsel in felony cases 6 ° and to transcripts for
appeals,' 6 ' and the rights of illegitimate children.' 62
a.

The Dangers of Using "Fundamental Interest"
as a Test

A danger associated with the compelling interest doctrine is its
potential for almost infinite expansion. Justice Harlan pointedly
described this danger:
It [the fundamental interest classification] is unfortunate and unnecessary. It is unfortunate because it creates an exception which
threatens to swallow the standard equal protection rule. Virtually
every state statute affects important rights . . . [T]o extend the

"compelling interest" rule to all cases in which such rights are
affected would go far toward making this Court a "super-legislature." This branch of the doctrine is also unnecessary. When the
right affected is one assured by the Federal Constitution, any
infringement can be dealt with under the Due Process Clause.
But when a statute effects only matters not mentioned in the
Federal Constitution and is not arbitrary or irrational ...

I know

of nothing which entitles this Court to pick out particular activities, characterize them as "fundamental," and give them added
1 63
protection under an unusually stringent equal protection test.
6
In Dandridge v. Williams,1
the Supreme Court retreated from
its position concerning fundamental interests as expressed in Shapiro
v. Thompson.' 65 Instead of extending the categories of fundamental
interests, the Court retreated toward Justice Harlan's position in his
Shapiro dissent and limited fundamental interests to affirmative constitutional rights.'66 In Dandridge, recipients of welfare benefits under
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program 67 asserted that
a state-imposed ceiling on payments violated the equal protection

157. Wealth as a factor has invoked the higher standard when relating to a
fundamental right such as voting, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,
668 (1966), or an indigent's right to a free transcript on appellate review, Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956).
158. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
159. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964).
160. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963).
161. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956).
162. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) ; Levy v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 68 (1968).
163. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 661-62 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
164. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
165. Id. at 484 n.16.
166. Id. at 484.
167. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq. (1970).
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clause because it discriminated against recipients with especially large
families. Although it acknowledged that "administration of public
welfare assistance . ..involves the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings,"' 8 the Court found no constitutional justification for applying the compelling interest standard to the state
action. Moreover, in the course of validating the state scheme, the
Court declared itself to be without constitutional power to "secondguess state officials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating
limited public welfare funds among the myriad of potential recipients,"' 6 9
and characterized the issue before it as one concerning only "state
regulation in the social and economic field, [and] not affecting freedoms
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights ....""'
The plaintiffs in Serrano and Rodriguez sought to test the alleged
discrimination by the compelling interest standard, claiming that education is a fundamental right,'' and that the classifications being
challenged were based on a suspect factor, wealth.' 2 Similarly, the
plaintiffs in Shaw attempted to prove that the discriminatory distribution of municipal services therein challenged was based on another
suspect factor, race. The courts accepted each of plaintiffs' allegations,
thus leaving the door open to further expansion of the fundamental
interest concept. Even if the Supreme Court had decided, as the
California Supreme Court did,' 4 that the more rigid test applies only
to classifications concerning fundamental interests, one need not unreasonably stretch his imagination to see that the arguments made in
Shaw could easily be merged with those of Serrano: the necessities of
life are the most fundamental human interests; local services, such as
water and sewerage, clearly involve such fundamental interests; therefore, any classification based on wealth that touches such fundamental
interests is subject to the compelling interest test. Inability to pay
75
thus becomes a discriminatory classification based on wealthy.
168. 397 U.S. at 485.
169. Id. at 487.
170. Id. at 484.

171. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 605-11, 487 P.2d 1241, 1255-59, 96 Cal. Rptr.
601, 615-19 (1971).
172. Id. at 598-605, 487 P.2d at 1250-55, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610-15.
173. 437 F.2d at 1287-88.
174. The California court read Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), and Harper
v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), narrowly and concluded that the

compelling interest standard was to be applied to suspect factors, such as wealth, only
if they also concerned fundamental interests. The court, nevertheless, found both the
fundamental interest and the suspect factor. 5 Cal. 3d at 605-07, 487 P.2d at 1255-56,
96 Cal. Rptr. at 615-16.
175. One writer has suggested the use of the Shaw rationale to aid the poor in
gaining equality in municipal services. He would combine traditional public utility
doctrine with the thrust of Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), to demonstrate that
municipal services must be financed by general revenues and supplied equally, or must
withstand challenge under the compelling interest standard. Abascal, Municipal
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In light of the facility with which the California Supreme Court
treated such a concept, in spite of language in Dandridge which was
apparently intended to limit use of the fundamental interest concept to
affirmative rights guaranteed by the Constitution, other courts would
have had no difficulty in expanding "fundamental interests" to include
almost all locally provided services." 6 If education were considered
fundamental, could providing water, gas, electricity, or sewerage service
be considered less fundamental? If these services are financed through
the property tax and are supplied unevenly because of the relative
wealth of different districts, or if they are financed by user charges
which the poor cannot afford to pay, they would be subject to a
177
Serrano-Shaw style attack.
b.

The Dangers of Using "Wealth" as
a Classification
A second danger in the application of the compelling interest test
in this setting is treating wealth as a suspect classification. In the
previous cases in which the doctrine developed, the interests at stake
were essentially noneconomic - for example, the right to vote and
the indigent's right to a fair trial. 7 Arguably, these interests could
have been protected on due process grounds alone, without resort to
the equal protection clause 179 because they are affirmatively guaranteed
by the Constitution. But unlike the right to vote and the right to
fair trial, the provision of basic economic needs is not guaranteed by
the Constitution. There is no affirmative right to welfare.18 0 Justice
Harlan, in his dissent in Douglas v. California,'' recognized how close
Services and Equal Protection: Variation on a Theme by Griffin v. Illinois, 20
HASTINGS L.J. 1367, 1389 (1969).

176. The Serrano court noted the possibility that the compelling interest test might
be expanded to other services in addition to education. In fact, the court cited Shaw
as such an example, noting that plaintiffs in Shaw had originally alleged discrimination
based on wealth only to drop the point on appeal. 5 Cal. 3d at 614-15, 487 P.2d at
1262-63, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 622-23. See note 177 infra. A fear of such unlimited expansion of the doctrine was clearly a factor in Rodriguez. See 93 S. Ct. at 1308-09.
177. Although the majority in Shaw did not distinguish services financed through
special assessments from those financed from general revenues, the concurring opinion
did. 437 F.2d at 1293 (Bell, J., concurring). Judge Bell cited Hadnott v. Prattville,
309 F. Supp. 967 (M.D. Ala. 1970), for the proposition that a city may provide
services dependent on special assessments, i.e., sewage, street lighting, street paving,
or drainage, and thus not paid for from general revenue, even if disparities result in
the level of services received by various residents within a city. This basis, even
though narrower than the majority's, remains open to the fundamental interest analysis
undertaken in Serrano-Rodriguez. Under that approach, street paving, sewage, or
water lines, among other services, might be found to be "fundamental," and therefore
required to be provided regardless of ability to pay.
178. See notes 154-62 and accompanying text supra.
179. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 361 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 29 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
180. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970).
181. 372 U.S. at 353, 361-62 (1963).
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the Court was coming to finding such an affirmative right. He discussed the problem more fully than the Court was later to do in
Dandridge when it accepted his basic position.
Every financial exaction which the State imposed on a uniform
basis is more easily satisfied by the well to do than by the indigent.
Yet I take it that no one would dispute the constitutional power
of the State to levy a uniform sales tax, to charge tuition at a
state university, to fix rates for the purchase of water from a
municipal corporation, to impose a standard fine for criminal
violations, or to establish minimum bail for various categories
of offenses ....

And surely, there would be no basis for attacking

a state law which provided benefits for the needy simply because
those benefits fall short of the goods or services that others could
purchase for themselves. Laws such as these do not deny equal
protection to the less fortunate for one essential reason: the Equal
Protection Clause does not impose on the States "an affirmative
duty to lift the handicaps flowing from differences in economic
circumstances." To so construe it would be to read into the
Constitution a philosophy of leveling that would be foreign to
many of our basic concepts of the proper relations between
government and society. The State may have a moral obligation
to eliminate the evils of poverty, but it is not required by the
Equal Protection Clause to give to some whatever others can
afford.1 82
By simply classifying services as fundamental or nonfundamental,
a court might hold that certain disparities which result from mere
inability to pay or from unequal property tax bases violate the equal
protection clause. However, in many situations, such a holding would
be the equivalent of finding an affirmative constitutional right to
publicly supported governmental services, regardless of Dandridge. If
the particular "fundamental" service involved is financed by user
charges or private assessments, forced equality would amount to taxing
others to provide the poor with basic services - welfare in kind.
Adhering to the Serrano and Shaw analysis and its use of the compelling interest doctrine would tend to divert a court's attention from
this most important and critical fact.
Certainly, when a state undertakes to provide welfare, it should
be under the obligation to administer that program impartially, notwithstanding the absence of a duty to institute the program in the
first instance. But when the state or locality merely licenses a public
utility to perform proprietary services which are financed by private
assessments, its relation to the individual is essentially different. It is
182. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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not attempting to create a welfare program, and it should not be forced
to do so. When the locality acts as a municipal corporation for providing services, that government's fiscal interest in making such
services self sufficient and privately supported through direct user
charges should be adequate justification for resulting disparities based
on wealth.
The decision to establish and operate welfare programs, whether by
making cash payments or providing services in kind, is a legislative
one. In the absence of a constitutional requirement to establish such
programs, the judiciary should refrain from interfering and refuse to
engraft such a requirement onto the Constitution.
2.

A Middle Ground Rational Basis Test
as an Alternative

While the Supreme Court wisely avoided an adventure into
metaphysics by rejecting the fundamental interest and suspect classification analyses, its inaction has left the nation with one of its most
critical, unresolved problems. In this respect, all of the Justices were
agreed that the problems associated with interdistrict inequities in
education are serious and deserve immediate attention.'"5 Even though
affirmance of the lower court decision on any ground would have
involved the judiciary in complex state and local service and tax
questions, the Court could have decided the case on the narrower
grounds suggested by Justice White in his dissent,' and have avoided
85
some of the more blatant dangers.
Justice White would have affirmed the lower court on an alternative
basis. In his dissent he outlined the following test:
The Equal Protection Clause permits discriminations between classes but requires that the classification bear some rational
183. 93 S. Ct. at 1309-10. See id. at 1312, 1315 & 1316 (Brennan, White &
Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
184. Id. at 1314-15 (White, J., dissenting).
185. If the Court had found education to be a fundamental interest, then any
different treatment accorded one class as against another would have had to be justified
in terms of a compelling state interest. Extending that standard to all aspects of
education would have invited the judiciary to substitute its judgment for that of the
legislature on critical policy matters.
Illustrating this point, in Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 876
(D.D.C. 1972), after quoting the same language from Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 493 (1954), as had the Serrano court (see note 118 supra), the court held
that funding deficiencies in educational programs "cannot be permitted to bear more
heavily on the 'exceptional' or handicapped child than on the normal child." 348 F.
Supp. at 874-75, 876. Such reasoning could give rise to a situation in which a legislature might find a rational basis for allocating scarce educational resources to
normal children rather than to the handicapped, only to have its judgment overruled
by a court finding that there existed no compelling state interest justifying the
different treatment.
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relationship
to a permissible object sought to be attained by the
6
statute.1
In applying this test, the object to be attained must first be
defined. For purposes of illustration, we may assume that the object' 87
of free public education is to provide a means for the children of the
state to acquire various skills that are deemed useful to society.
Once the goal is determined, whatever class discriminations that are
found to exist must be evaluated in terms of their relationship to
the intended goal. Then, if the discrimination bears no rational relationship to the legislative goal, the discrimination must be judged
invalid.
Although some dispute existed over the nature of the class discrimination that the Rodriguez plaintiffs demonstrated, 88 at the very
186. 93 S. Ct. at 1314.
187. Id. at 1305. In analyzing the problem in terms of the rational basis test, the
majority did not attempt to define the object, or purpose, underlying state intervention
in education. In other words, the majority apparently found irrelevant questions
concerning why the states have created systems of free public education and what
they expect to accomplish for their citizens through these programs. Instead, the
majority simply reasoned from the premise that local control is in itself a legitimate
end. See id. Under this analysis, programs that contribute to the end of maximizing
local control would appear to be justifiable on that fact alone. This method of
analysis, however, is questionable. Local control does not appear to be an end in
itself, but rather a means to an end. While there is no such thing as a local control
program, there are programs which can best be effected if they are locally controlled.
Local control, then, is not an object in itself but rather an attribute of other objects.
By according independent status to the concept of local control, the majority
seems to have ignored Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964). There, the
Court was faced with a situation in which one county in the state exercised its local
option, consistent with the laws of Virginia, to close its schools in order to avoid
integration. The issue in Grifin involved "not something which the State has commanded Prince Edward to do - close its public schools and give grants to children
in private schools - but rather something which the county with state acquiescence
and cooperation has undertaken to do on its own volition .... " Id. at 228. Speaking
for the Court, Justice Black stated that "[w]hatever nonracial grounds might
support a State's allowing a county to abandon public schools, the object must be a
constitutional one, and grounds of race and opposition to desegregation do not
qualify as constitutional." Id. at 231 (footnote omitted). Apart from the question
of race, the Court did not treat the concept of local control as an object in itself,
but rather viewed it as an ingredient of the means chosen to effect the ultimate
object of education.
If the majority's reasoning in Rodriguez is carried to its logical extreme,
there is no reason why a state might not make education a completely local matter.
Conceivably, Griffin could be read narrowly as a suspect factor case, thereby leaving
states free to delegate total responsibility for funding and administering education to
local school districts in the name of local autonomy, no matter what disparities might
be shown.
One practical consideration that should be raised is the likely future impact
of Rodriguez on reformation of state funding programs for education. While governors and legislatures do not mind spending money, they are loath to raise it. The
Rodriguez decision may have the effect of inviting state officials to assign localities a
greater, not lesser, role in public school finance, thereby widening already existing
disparities. With less vigilance by the courts, state officials may be tempted to pass
the revenue-raising buck to local officials who will be confronted with ever-increasing
financial demands and no correlative financial resources.
188. Plaintiffs contended that the Texas school financing system discriminated not
simply against the poor in some districts but against the poor in general. An under-
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least, the Court was confronted with a situation in which the plaintiffs'
district had less taxpaying ability'89 than other districts in the state. 190
There was no dispute that the taxpaying ability of the individual districts in Texas determined the availability of resources to be devoted
to educational programs within each district.' 9 ' Thus, the Court was
faced with the fact that the plaintiffs, and all others who reside in
districts with low taxpaying ability, had fewer resources available to
meet educational needs. With this aspect of the service delivery scheme
established, it was necessary to inquire whether a rational relationship
existed between the object of providing public education and the class
discrimination that had resulted from the means chosen to effect
that end.
Having isolated the disadvantaged class, those who reside in
districts with low taxpaying ability, it is necessary to examine the
attributes of that class to determine if there is some rational basis
for depriving them of the same educational opportunities that the
other class enjoys.
There is little hard, empirical evidence concerning the demographic composition of school districts with low taxpaying ability. The
plaintiffs, however, asserted that a sufficient correlation existed between
the districts in which the poor, the black, and the brown resided and
those in which educational expenditures were low, 9 ' thereby justifying
the finding of invidious discrimination. One of the few empirical
studies on this subject, 9 3 however, disputed that assertion. Based upon
existing evidence, it must be presumed that there are no significant
demographic factors distinguishing those who live in low-taxpaying
districts and those who live in high-taxpaying districts.
If this is true, and the majority in Rodriguez seemed to accept
the proposition, the only distinctions that can be shown between the
lying assumption of the plaintiffs is that a correlation exists between district wealth,
expressed in terms of assessable property per pupil, and personal wealth. Cf. 93 S. Ct.
at 1290-91. In refusing to accept this premise, the majority cited recent empirical studies: Ridenour & Ridenour, Serrano v. Priest: Wealth and Kansas School
Finance, 20 KAN. L. REv. 213 (1972) ; Note, A Statistical Analysis of the School
Finance Decisions: On Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 YALE L.J. 1303 (1972).
189. See note 136 and accompanying text supra.
190. The issue of measurement of Texas school districts' taxpaying ability was
not directly decided by the majority. See 93 S. Ct. at 1293. Still, however, it is unlikely that anyone would seriously contend that all districts have the same taxpaying
ability. On the basis of the evidence presented by plaintiffs (see id. at 1287 n.38),
it should be clear that Edgewood, the district in which the appellees reside, is, at the
very least, among those districts in Texas with low taxpaying ability.
191. Id. at 1303-04.
192. Id. at 1282.
193. See Note, supra note 188, at 1328-29, which documented that "poor" families,
as defined by the Bureau of the Census, are not congregated in enclaves with low
property assessments. Rather, in Connecticut, where the study was made, the poor
were found to live near major industries representing high assessed valuations.
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classes relate to those economic factors that determine taxpaying ability.
Using one of those factors194 as an example - the incidence of industries possessing market power subject to property taxation within
the district in which a particular student resides - the problem of
establishing a rational relationship becomes clearer. In order for there
to be a rational relationship between the goal of imparting skills to a
student and the means for providing it, some evidence must be shown
to support the inference that children who live in geographic proximity
to industries with market power are more likely to benefit from
exposure to educational programs than those who do not. Significantly,
and not controverted by the Rodriguez majority, the existence or nonexistence of wealth in a given political subdivision is little more than
"happenstance." 19 5 When analyzed then, the plaintiffs' characterization
of the class discrimination as "invidious" is somewhat overstated;
rather, the discrimination appears to be simply silly. Happenstance
is, by definition, devoid of rationality and classes determined by that
criteria bear no rational relationship to any goal.
In its analysis of the rationality of the service delivery system,
the Rodriguez majority did not concentrate upon its relationship to
the objective of providing education. Instead, the Court reasoned that
local control in decision making, through the medium of the preservation of independent local access to revenue,19" is a legitimate state
interest in itself.19 ' In rebutting this reasoning, Mr. Justice White
stated:
It is not enough that the Texas system before us seeks to achieve
the valid, national purpose of maximizing local initiative; the
194. See notes 58-112 and accompanying text supra.
195. See 93 S. Ct. at 1307.
196. In discussing an hypothesized public education system in which each student
would have to pay full tuition in order to attend school, the majority suggested that
a more compelling reason would exist for finding an invidious discrimination against
the "poor." In this situation, the Court recognized that the poor might not receive
any education at all. Under the Texas system, however, the Court found the state
minimum, as represented by the Foundation School Program, to be "adequate."
Id. at 1291-92.
This reasoning reveals a basic flaw in the majority's approach to the problem.
Of the 50 states, there are presently 50 definitions of "adequate" state participation.
See STATE AID TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 26, at 31-59. If the Court is
saying that no state aid at all is inadequate, then what is the least state assistance
that would be adequate? This kind of determination could involve the courts in a
protracted case-by-case exercise if the term "adequate" was intended to have any
meaning at all. A safer ground of decision in this respect would be to abandon the
concept of adequacy and hold, as the district court did, that adequacy may be a factor
only to the extent that expenditures in some districts are more adequate than others.
337 F. Supp. at 284. Utilizing this reasoning, the state would not be obligated to
provide any education at all, but to the extent that it does, it must provide the same
amount for all.
197. 93 S. Ct. at 1300-01, quoting Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940).
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means chosen by the State must also be rationally related to the
end sought to be achieved.' 98
Under the rational basis analysis undertaken by Justice White, local
control may justify any number of financing schemes devised by the
state provided that no scheme results in resources being channeled to
districts on a basis unrelated to a valid educational goal.
For the present, and probably for the foreseeable future, the federal
judiciary cannot be expected to participate in rationalizing service
delivery and tax problems that state and local governments have been
experiencing over the last several decades. The primary role of indicating flaws in the manner in which state and local services are
provided will now quite likely shift from the federal courts to state
courts' 99 and legislatures and to the Congress. In any event, whichever
institution attempts to modernize and make more equitable the dis198. 93 S. Ct. at 1314.
199. Just two weeks after the Supreme Court reversed the Rodriguez case, the New
Jersey Supreme Court struck down New Jersey's present method of school finance.
Robinson v. Cahill, --- N.J.
,.
A.2d ---(1973). The plaintiff in Robinson
presented facts to the New Jersey Court similar to those that the plaintiffs in
Rodriguez had presented to the Supreme Court. Both interdistrict disparities in per
pupil expenditures and differentials in the ratio of taxable property per pupil were
shown. Unlike the Supreme Court, however, the New Jersey Court accepted per
pupil expenditure differentials as indicative of unequal access to equality of educational opportunity. But like the Supreme Court, the New Jersey Court found neither
the fundamental interest nor the suspect factor analysis approach helpful. The New
Jersey Court, in a clear effort not to entangle itself in the broader issue of which
services may be financed locally and therefore unequally among districts decided the
case on state constitutional grounds unique to New Jersey. Id. at -.-, -_ A.2d at _
Neither state nor federal equal protection theories were used to resolve the problem.
Rather, the New Jersey Court, as the legal basis for its action, seized upon
an 1875 amendment to article IV, section 7, paragraph 6, of the 1844 New Jersey
Constitution, which provides that:
The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and
efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in this
state between the ages of 5 and 18 years.
Based upon legal arguments peculiar to New Jersey, the court found that the legislature, by permitting wide disparities in per pupil expenditures to arise among the
districts, had not met its constitutionally mandated responsibility to provide a "thorough
and efficient system of free public schools." Specifically, the court held that:
[I]f the State chooses to assign its obligation under the 1875 amendment to local
government, the State must do so by a plan which will fulfill the State's continuing obligation. To that end the State must define in some discernible way the
educational obligation and must compel the local school districts to raise the money
necessary to provide that opportunity ....
Upon the record before us, it may be
doubted that the thorough and efficient system of schools required by the 1875
amendment can realistically be met by reliance upon local taxation. The discordant correlations between the educational needs of the school districts and
their respective tax bases suggest any such effort would likely fail . ...
Id. at--------A.2d at
. After pointing to inherent difficulties in utilization
of local tax bases, the court went on to state:
Nor do we say that if the State assumes the cost of providing the constitutionally
mandated education, it may not authorize local government to go further and to
tax to that further end, provided that such authorization does not become a
device for diluting the State's mandated responsibility.
Id. at -----.--------A.2d at - .... This last remark, apparently an attempt to preserve
the notion of an individual district's right to spend more on education than its neighbors, raises serious problems, perhaps unforeseen by the court. Beyond the fact that
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tribution of both state and local services and tax burdens, its effort
must focus upon the role of the local tax base and its limitations.
IV.

THE SERVICE ANALYSIS PRINCIPLE
AS AN ALTERNATIVE

This section will attempt to develop a systematic approach for
handling disparities in all classes of state and local government services.
Since the Supreme Court has held that the "fundamental interest" and
"suspect factor" analyses are inappropriate analytical frameworks for
coping with these problems, a different approach must be developed.
In meeting the needs of its citizens, the state should be accorded
20 0
flexibility in devising specific service delivery and tax programs.
it was disparities, large and small, that first attracted the attention of the courts, monitoring these disparities in the context of the court's opinion might well prove impossible.
To illustrate, the court is in effect holding that once the legislature provides
for a "thorough and efficient system of free public schools," local districts may then
add an increment from their own tax bases on top of this minimum. Such an approach,
however, presupposes that "thorough and efficient" can be judicially determined in
terms of an absolute dollar amount. Following this reasoning, once the court is
satisfied that the legislature has met its responsibility, it may permit the legislature
to authorize additional local expenditures. This reasoning ignores the fact that this is
essentially the same situation that now exists, except that the basic state aid program
has been held constitutionally insufficient. In this respect, the court's opinion gives
little guidance at what point it would find that a hypothetical state aid program would
be sufficient. This problem of the judiciary defining "thorough and efficient" can
only be avoided by confining judicial intervention to determining whether all classes
are treated the same or not, if not, does a "rational basis" exist for the discrepancy the kind of equal protection inquiry suggested by Mr. Justice White in his dissent in
Rodriguez. See text accompanying note 186 supra. In other words, the judiciary
is better equipped to ensure that the legislature treats all classes the same, than to
dictate to the legislature how much education is enough to satisfy the constitutional standard.
New Jersey, then, represents a case in point in which a state court has
attacked the problem of irrationalities in school finance. As state courts undertake
the problem of coping with the school finance issue in the aftermath of Rodriguez,
other state and federal courts, as well as the various state legislatures, should benefit
from the problems brought to light by these inquiries.
200. In a different context, the Supreme Court has recently held that the one man
one vote doctrine of Reynold v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and Kramer v. Union
Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969), did not extend to water districts. Salyer
Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 93 S. Ct. 1224 (1973). Under
the challenged California law. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 41000-01 (West 1966), voting is
limited to property owners whose votes are weighted on the basis of one vote for each
$100 of assessment. The plaintiff attacked the state voting scheme as a denial of
equal protection. In rejecting plaintiff's contention, the Court distinguished the instant
case from previous cases in which the one man-one vote principle had been ignored
by state voting statutes. See Cipriano v. City of Hauna, 395 U.S. 701 (1969), where
the Court struck down a Louisiana statute which gave only property owners the right
to vote in elections to approve the issuance of revenue bonds by a municipal utility,
and Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., supra, where the Court struck down a voter
qualification statute for school districts which limited the vote to owners or lessees of
taxable real property located within the district, spouses of property owners, or
parents or guardians of children enrolled in the school.
In defining the public policy underlying whether the public in general, as
opposed to private landowners in particular, should run water districts, the majority
focused on the relationship between the service, water supply, and the recipients, users
of irrigation projects. The minority, however, approached the problem differently and
instead concentrated upon the nature of the entity providing the service rather than
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While maximum flexibility should be accorded the legislature, flexibility
should not be permitted to mask irrationality. In this respect, the
method chosen by a legislature to meet a legislatively defined need
should be rationally related to the purpose behind that need. Therefore,
insofar as the property tax is concerned, application of this test requires
that the economic effects of property tax financing for particular
programs bear some rational relationship to the desired goal of those
programs.
A. Categorization of Services
For purposes of analysis, services will be characterized on the
basis of two basic principles: (1) consumers of services should pay
for what they receive ;201 and (2) the state has no affirmative constitutional duty to provide welfare or to redistribute income downwardly.
In view of these principles, services can be classified as (1) private,
upon the service itself. In this respect, the minority pointed out that water storage
districts are considered to be governmental and not proprietary units under California
law; that directors of the district are public officers of the state; that the district
possesses the power of eminent domain; that it may not be taxed; and that the
district possesses governmental immunity against suit. 93 S. Ct. at ---.
The majority apparently grounded its decision on the fact that the district does :
[N]ot exercise what might be thought of as "normal governmental" authority
but [that] its actions disproportionately affect landowners . . . . All of the costs
of district projects are assessed against land by assessors in proportion to the
benefits received. Likewise, charges for services rendered are collectible from
persons receiving their benefit in proportion to the services.
Id. at-.
By focusing upon the nature of the service, the relationship of the
recipients to the service, and how the cost of the service is defrayed, instead of relying upon the presence of governmental trappings, it becomes clear that water districts
more nearly approximate private utilities than social services run by genuine governmental bodies.
While not directly in point to the analysis suggested in this Article, this
holding does establish that certain services performed by governmental entities may
still be considered to be essentially private, notwithstanding the fact that a governmental entity is charged with the responsibility for providing the service. An understanding that this distinction exists and that it can be delineated is critical to the
alternative method of analysis suggested in this Article.
201. This benefit theory of taxation is well established as constitutional doctrine;
for example, the present use of special assessments against property owners to defray
the cost of improvements that particularly benefit their property. In Norwood v.
Baker, 172 U.S. 269 (1898), the Supreme Court outlined the following rule:
[T]he principle underlying special assessments to meet the cost of public improvements is that the property upon which they are imposed is peculiarly benefited,
and therefore, the owners do not, in fact, pay anything in excess of what they
receive by reason of such improvement ....
[T]he exaction from the owner of private property of the cost of public
improvement in substantial excess of the special benefits accruing to him is, to
the extent of such excess, a taking, under the guise of taxation, of private
property for public use without compensation. We say "substantial excess,"
because exact equality of taxation is not always attainable, and for that reason
the excess of cost over special benefits, unless it be of a material character, ought
not to be regarded by a court of equity when its aid is invoked to restrain
enforcement of a special assessment.
Id. at 278-79. For a detailed discussion of application of benefit principles of taxation
in local governmental finance, see E. MCQUILLIN, LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
18-43 (3d ee. 1950).
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(2) social with significant spillover, and (3) social without significant
spillover, and the duties of the governmental unit providing them can
be defined.
1.

Private Services

Private services are those services in which benefits are provided
directly, in discrete amounts, to identifiable individuals or family and
business units.2 0 2 Private services do, in fact, constitute the bulk of
governmental services in our free enterprise society. However, nothing
in the Constitution guarantees that income or services be provided
by government to the citizenry. 0
Nevertheless, constitutional constraints do exist which affect how government must distribute those
benefits that legislative bodies, consistent with their delegated powers,
choose to dispense. 0 4 Absent a legislative decision to convert a private
service to a social one, all services, from television repair to health
care, to electric power and water, are private, and should be available
only to those who can afford to pay for them. The fact that a given
service is franchised by the government should be irrelevant in determining whether services are private or social. In view of our historical, and continuing theoretical commitment to private enterprise,
publicly provided services should be regarded as private, absent a
clear legislative determination that they should be converted, through
subsidization, into social services.
The courts' role in dealing with disparities in private services
should be limited to the traditional, public utility doctrine. Briefly, a
"municipality which provides services similar to those provided by
privately owned public utilities has a duty to serve all members of the
public within its territorial boundaries in an equal and undiscriminatory
manner."25 Here, the individual's relation to the governmental unit
providing the service is essentially that of a consumer to a seller of any
commercial product. Although the governmental unit does have a
higher duty than the private seller in that it must sell to all,20 6 neither
202. See note 63 supra.
203. See text accompanying notes 180-82 supra.
204. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
205. Abascal, supra note 175, at 1372. See Note, The Duty of a Public Utility to
Render Adequate Service: Its Scope and Enforcement, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 312 (1962).
206. Even if a utility such as water, gas, or electricity is franchised, but not
subsidized, by a local government, there exists some form of "state action" which
might expose it to the proscriptions of the fourteenth amendment. In the absence
of public subsidization, however, elimination of disparities in the level of public
services among both individuals and communities because of variations in the wealth
of the respective individuals and communities does not seem appropriate. For example,
insofar as education is concerned, a deliberate scheme of subsidization exists because
legislative bodies have decided that education is the kind of service that all should
have irrespective of ability to pay. Therefore, when some, because of geography,
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it nor the private seller has a duty to provide its services or product
20
free to the poor.

7

Those unable to purchase private services must look for relief to
the legislative branch rather than the judicial branch of government.
Providing the poor with basic services, whether in kind or by cash
transfers to purchase these services, is a political decision. In the
absence of a constitutional right to welfare, the courts are an inappropriate forum for gaining equality in the amounts of private services
individuals receive. By refraining from guaranteeing equal amounts
of private services to the poor, a court maintains both guiding principles.
The benefits individuals receive are purchased, and the decision to
provide welfare to the poor is left to the legislature.
2.

Social Services

Social services are those with indivisible benefits which accrue to
society at large. Included within this category is the entire array of
education and welfare programs, as well as any "private" services that
a legislature chooses to subsidize. The critical test, in this respect,
focuses upon subsidization. If a legislative body decides that a particular service is sufficiently important or so "fundamental" that society
should enjoy the benefit of such a program, in spite of the fact that
the private economy will not sustain it, then the legislative decision, to
provide that service at less than unit cost to those who cannot otherare denied the same level of service that others receive, the fourteenth amendment
should be applicable. On the other hand, a city may grant an exclusive franchise to
a transportation company to make bus service available to those citizens who are
willing to pay for it. The mere granting of an exclusive franchise should not be
converted into an obligation on the part of the city to provide free bus service to all
who desire it. The granting of the franchise should simply necessitate that rates
be the same for all similarly situated citizens and that no citizen who can pay the
applicable rate be denied service.
207. See note 65 and accompanying text supra. As a matter of fact, many of these
services are presently being provided on a "free" basis. For instance, it is commonplace for utilities to be subsidized via local property tax transfers. See ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FACTORS AFFECTING VOTER
TIONS TO GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION IN METROPOLITAN AREAS 52-53

REAc-

(1962).
This is accomplished by public utilities gaining access to property tax revenue and
using such revenue to keep utility rates artificially low. As an example of this
practice, water control and improvement districts in Texas may both levy taxes and
set water rates to defray costs. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 7880-77a (1954).
Nothing, however, forbids such a district, if the voter-taxpayers can be persuaded,
from using property tax revenue to keep rates low.
Two dysfunctional implications arise from this practice. First, users of water
as a class receive "free" water as welfare; that is, they receive water without paying
its full cost. Users of water as a class is not a rational class for distributing welfare,
since some users of water are quite wealthy. Further compounding the irrationality
of this practice, property taxpayers who pay for the "free" water include both rich
and poor alike. The net result is that some poor property taxpayers subsidize "free"
water for some wealthy water users. Secondly, using the property tax to subsidize
"free" private services tends to preempt the property tax from adequately supporting
social services. Once again, it should be emphasized that private services should be
self-sustaining, thereby leaving the tax base free to pay for social services.
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wise afford it, marks the point of conversion from what may have
previously been a private service into a public service. Such an effort,
in reality, amounts to an attempt to redistribute income downward.
A further characteristic of social services is that, although the initial
benefit may be conferred directly on an individual, as with welfare or
education, the ultimate benefit redounds to society as a whole. For
example, since education substantially benefits all of society, all taxpayers should support it; its cost should be defrayed by general revenues; and these revenues should be generated by a broadly based tax,
preferably one based on ability to pay, such as a graduated income tax.
Matching recipients of indivisible benefits to the proper tax base
is further complicated by the spillover concept.2" 8 If the tax is actually
to be borne by recipients of the benefit, the proper geographical area
must be drawn. Since the state is the largest political unit with
general welfare powers, it should serve as the basic taxing unit for
social services with significant spillover. Ideally, the federal government should help finance those services with the greatest spillover, such
as education and welfare. Social services with limited spillover should
be financed by a smaller unit. Fire and police protection. for example,
benefit only the residents of a particular community or town and should
be financed by that unit.
Where the benefit of a service has significant spillover and extends
throughout the whole state, it is a "state function" and the whole state
should finance it. When performing such a governmental function
which benefits all its members, the state should have an affirmative
duty to insure equality in the level of service. Therefore, the state
cannot permit local subdivisions to exercise local choice over the level
of the service to be provided. Because the service is a state function,
decisions about the level of that service should be made by the corporate
body that receives the benefit and bears the burden of the tax.
3.

Spillover

Once individual services have been categorized as either private
or social, there is the further question of whether all social services
must be provided equally in all geographic areas of the state. Traditionally, states have not been compelled to treat all citizens in all
geographic areas alike so long as there existed some rational basis for
differentiation. 0 9 The purpose of this analysis is to ascertain whether
208. See STATE AID TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 26, at 6-7.

209. See Abascal, supra note 175, at 1372-73; Horowitz & Neitring, Equal Protection Aspects of Inequalities in Public Education and Public Assistance Programs
from Place to Place Within a State, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 787, 797-800 (1969).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973

53

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 4 [1973], Art. 1
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 18: p.

527

a state scheme for providing various social services with significant
spillover out of local tax revenues on a local option theory can be
justified on a rational basis test.2"' Brief examples of rational bases for
differentiation on a geographic basis might include the following: an
irrigation subsidy for all areas in the state of less than 10 inches
rainfall; a public utility subsidy for all citizens living in sparsely populated regions; or a public transportation subsidy for mass urban transit
in densely populated areas. 2 ' Social programs, or private services
that a legislature converts into social services through subsidization,
fall into two distinct categories. Certain social programs, such as fire
and police protection, are undertaken as traditional governmental
services necessary to permit society to function.2 2 Other social programs, however, are undertaken in order to redistribute income downward,213 to provide welfare-in-kind. An example of these programs is
210. Other writers, most notably Coons, Clune, and Sugarman, have not attacked
disparities in education and other services as being violative of the rational basis
standard. Instead, the thrust of their attack has been to create a legal argument for
bringing education within the "inner circle" of rights subject to the compelling state
interest standard. See Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra note 138, at 346-51. The
purpose of this Article is to analyze services in economic terms in order to determine
whether a rational basis does, in fact, exist for permitting interdistrict disparities in
certain kinds of services. Central to this analysis is the notion that the existence of
substantial "spillover" in itself precludes a state from being able to show any rational
basis for disparities in service levels.
211. Local option subsidizing of any of these services will inevitably result in
similarly situated service recipients receiving disparate amounts of service depending
upon the wealth of their respective local tax bases and upon the capacity of their
respective tax bases to shift the tax forward and export it away from the jurisdiction.
Using the first mentioned subsidy as an example, the lack of any rational basis for
local option financing becomes apparent.
If Ector County, Texas, which has a wealthy tax base as a result of vast oil
reserves within its boundaries (see notes 100-08 and accompanying text supra), were
to choose to subsidize irrigation on a local option basis, then its citizens could enjoy
reduced water cost with little actual cost to themselves. However, the neighboring
counties, with relatively poorer tax bases would not be as likely to subsidize irrigation.
Assuming all agricultural and market factors to be identical, there is no rational basis
for a subsidy program in which a farmer-recipient in Ector County is much more
likely to receive a subsidy than an identical farmer-recipient in a neighboring county.
If there is a need for subsidizing irrigation to stimulate agricultural development, there
is certainly no rationality in subsidizing on the basis of a farmer's geographic
proximity to oil. A similar argument may be made for subsidization of public utilities
and public transportation. If certain categories of citizens are defined as "needy,"
i.e., those who need a public utility but who live in a sparsely settled area or those
who need mass transit because they live in a congested urban area, making these
services available in rough proportion to the incidence of "golden" industries in their
respective jurisdictions is irrational on its face.
212. Such governmental functions have been labelled as "uniquely public activities,"
or have historically been financed from general revenues and have been viewed as not
conferring any special benefits to particular individuals or groups. See Comment,
Rational Classification Problems in Financing State and Local Government, 76 YALE
L.J. 1206, 1210-12 (1967).
213. The inquiry undertaken by some courts to determine whether the general
public or particular individuals benefit from a particular service, cf. Hammet v.
Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 146 (1869), illustrates the judicial viability of a determination
of whether the "primary" purpose and effect of a program is to redistribute income
downward, or whether such effect is only "incidental." See Erie v. Russell, 148 Pa.
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public housing subsidies designed to provide shelter for those otherwise
unable to afford it. In an historical, as well as operational, context,
housing is not identified with governmental action as such. The
government, without attempting to convert this service into a uniquely
governmental activity, has merely intruded into this area to meet a
politically perceived need.
Insofar as education is concerned, substantial spillover is readily
apparent. An entire state benefits from a high level of education in
any area; likewise, an entire state will suffer from enclaves of poor
education. 14 Other programs, however, raise more difficult questions.
The difficulty arises from the imprecision in measurement of the geographic extent of the incidence and impact of benefits.
If the prime effect of a locality offering a social service is to
redistribute income downwardly, then such a service has spillover by
virtue of that fact alone. This stems from the fact that when one
locality, in relation to the others around it, reduces the price of
certain services and increases the burden on its tax base, all localities,
not just the taxing and spending locality, are affected.215 Depending
upon the economic equation at the time, other localities, in order to
compete with the acting locality, must either raise benefits, reduce
taxes, or suffer the consequences of inaction. Such redistribution of
384 (1892). In both of the aforementioned cases, the courts attempted to identify
the incidence of benefits of particular programs because in each instance special tax
assessments were levied against individual property owners. The challenging taxpayers contested tax liability on the theory that the particular programs involved
inured to the benefit of the general populace and, therefore, should not have been paid
for by means of special tax assessments directed at a limited number of taxpayers.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed and ruled in favor of the taxpayers.
214.

STATE AID TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT,

supra note 26, at 18-20.

215. Problems involving direct local subsidies to particular businesses in order to
attract industry are similar in concept to problems involving tax and service differentials among localities growing out of local option subsidization of services which
tend to redistribute income downwardly. Many states permit individual localities, on
a local option basis, to grant local tax exemptions or to pledge public credit for
building plant facilities for lease-back to private industry in order to attract business
activity to their area. See Alyea, supra note 96, at 141-44. The economic effects of
these financial inducements are not confined to the locality granting favors to business or taxing business to subsidize services. The inducements have been characterized as "wasteful, unethical, abortive, insidious, unnecessary, destructive of the
tax base, of questionable legality, shortsighted, conducive to suidical inter-community
competition, and a handicap to sustainable economic growth and the maximization
of national income." Id. at 147. See BOND FINANCING, supra note 91. When one
locality acts, it forces others to act, thereby magnifying problems of misallocation
of resources among localities within a region.
However, direct subsidies to businesses often are made in the interest of
public policy. See Port Authority v. Fisher, 275 Minn. 157, 145 N.W.2d 560 (1966).
If for instance, a state-level planning body decides to induce industry to locate in a
given area, its decision may be quite rational. Transferring such decisions to the state
level would reduce, if not eliminate, the irrational economic effects of interdistrict
competition, just as centralized state financing of social services with economic spillover would reduce, if not eliminate, disparate service levels among localities.
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income is, quite obviously, an improper task to assign to political
216
subdivisions within a state.
Whether and to what extent many social programs have spillover
depends upon a given program's income redistributive effects. Redistribution of income may be the "primary" effect of a program, or
only an "incidental" effect.1 17 Obvious examples of such redistributive
services include the cluster of health and welfare programs. Less
obvious examples of such services include subsidized utilities and
transportation programs. To illustrate the economic problems created
by local option financing, one locality offering higher cash welfare
payments than surrounding localities has an obvious and immediate
impact in terms of interdistrict resource allocation. While not so
obvious, one locality offering subsidized utility rates, oftentimes financed
through forward shifting of the property tax, also has an impact on
interdistrict resource allocation. Thus, while one might argue that
certain of these services, sewage for instance, have only local economic impact, local subsidization of these services can have significant
extralocal consequences. 218 The tendency of a given service to redistribute income downwardly creates a significant spillover effect.
On the other hand, social programs of governmental nature, not
conceived in an effort to redistribute income downwardly, do represent
a class of governmental services for which some basis does exist for
permitting service levels to be locally determined. If a governmental
program is not inherently one with significant spillover, then such a
program should be left to the localities within a state to fund and
administer. Such programs, because of the limited incidence of
benefits, have no significant spillover; that is, service level and tax
level disparities among local governments have no appreciable economic
impact outside of the localities providing them. Law enforcement and
fire protection are examples of such programs; citizens in one district
are not significantly affected by the levels of fire and police protection
that exist in a neighboring district. Economic effects arising from
disparate levels in these basic services are confined, therefore, to the
particular localities choosing the levels. Since these services have
little impact outside the jurisdiction performing them, the level of
service is appropriately determined at the local level. This determination of the existence or nonexistence of spillover, is a scientific
and not a metaphysical inquiry.2 1
216. See

STATE AID TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT,

supra note 26, at 65.

217. See note 213 supra. See also Comment, supra note 212, at 1207-08.
218. See notes 90-99 and accompanying text supra.
219. See G. BREAK, supra note 62, at 176.
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B.

Problems of Implementation

Local tax bases, whether income, sales, or property, should be
limited to the support of local social services. Only in this manner
can disparities in the relative level of social services authorized by
the state and having a statewide impact be eliminated. In addition to
coping with possible equal protection challenges to state action in this
area, application of the service analysis principle (SAP) offers both
a more scientific approach than the present fundamental interest doctrine and the opportunity for a more efficient utilization of tax dollars.
Application of this principle to Texas would require more conceptual, than practical, changes, because most social services with substantial spillover are presently state operated. As a result of the Rodriguez holding, however, education, the largest and most visible such program, will continue to be significantly financed at the local level.
The second major social service with spillover, welfare, is, however,
a state-operated program. 22 ' By denying localities the power to supplement welfare, Texas avoids the many dysfunctional economic effects
that confront states such as California. 2
Moreover, Texas local
governments apparently do not attempt to provide welfare-in-kind at
the expense of property taxpayers.222 Unquestionably, however, many
relatively minor violations of this principle do exist. For example,
cities may pledge property tax revenue for support of certain utility
bonds,2 2 as well as bonds supporting certain recreational projects. 24
Merely because governmental entities perform these services is not
sufficient cause to burden taxpayers, as opposed to users, with the
expense of financing private services. Inasmuch as any local effort to
provide these services via a local tax base will result in interdistrict
inequalities, such an effort should raise constitutional problems. Cities
and counties in Texas do in large measure try to finance most private
services through user and licensing fees and they should be encouraged
to continue the practice.225
Besides education, the major exception in Texas to the prohibition
of localities from providing welfare-in-kind lies in its scheme for estab220. The federal and state governments share the total cost of welfare in Texas.

The federal government pays approximately 70 per cent of the $905.6 million total.
TEXAS

LEGISLATIVE

BUDGET

OFFICE,

FISCAL

SIZE

Up

-

TEXAS

STATE

SERVICES

1971-1972, at 46 (1971).
221. California's situation demonstrates the problems arising from permitting local
supplementation of federal and state welfare programs. Irrational service and tax
patterns exist which penalize recipients of welfare in districts where expenditures are
ow and taxpayers in districts where expenditures are high. See Horowitz & Neitring,
supra note 209, at 812-16.
222. See text following note 207 supra.
223. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1106 (1963).
224. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
225. See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
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lishing and financing public hospitals. Under the Texas constitution,
certain cities or counties may, with the permission of the voter-taxpayers, create a hospital district.226 These hospitals, however, have
not been provided equally to the needy in all parts of the state.227
If this form of welfare-in-kind is to be provided at all, then it ought
to be provided to the needy in all parts of the state as a social service
with substantial spillover effect. When viewed as a state program,
there is little rationality in discriminating against the needy on' a
geographic basis.
In regard to other locally performed services, to the extent subsidies are needed to make these heretofore private services function
properly, such subsidies should be financed at the state level in order
to remain within the SAP. Since variants of the user charge method
are now being utilized to finance these services, these techniques should
be expanded and continued.22
Although the task of implementing such an approach is difficult,
it is by no means impossible. Certainly, if courts can distinguish between governmental and proprietary services, as they have in the past,
categorizing specific governmental programs into one of three categories - social with significant spillover, social without significant
spillover, and private - can be accomplished. 229 The changes needed
226. TEX. CONST. art. IX, § 9, provides for the creation of local hospital districts
and empowers localities to tax, through the local property tax, in order to pay for
these services.
227. The state makes no effort to provide basic state aid for public health facilities.
Thus, each district, if a hospital district has been created, spends as much or as little
as local taxpayers choose. Clearly, wide disparities exist in the level and quality
of this form of welfare-in-kind among the various areas of the state. The Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations has recently suggested a state program
of equalization of local property tax bases, in order to enable each locality to enjoy

a somewhat equal program.

SIGNIFICANT FEATURES,

supra note 4, at App . ---

Even

though this approach would be a significant step forward, it is subject to the same
flaws as the system of power-equalization, proposed for the schools. See note 140
and accompanying text supra.
228. Utilization of a "family of user charges" to finance certain services provided
by local governments is a major policy conclusion of a leading authority on the
property tax - Dick Netzer. See D. NETZER, supra note 84, at 214-17.
229. Such distinctions are presently made by economists. See G. BREAK, supra
note 62, at 176. The spillover concept, in particular, is recognized as a viable distinction. See STATE AID TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 26, at 6-7; Brazer, supra
note 141, at 251-53. Certainly courts, with the aid of economists and other experts,
can draw these lines. While it is true that these categories would be judge-made,
there is nothing novel in this approach. The well-established governmental-proprietary
dichotomy used in determining governmental immunity is also a judge-made doctrine.
In view of the fact that courts have not hesitated to give meaning to such broad
concepts as "excessive profits," Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948), it is
submitted that no barrier, such as lack of justiciable standards or judicial manageability, exists.
Recently, courts have, in fact, shown a new willingness to resolve judicially
intricate problems involving governmental services. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344
F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), in which the court, redressing what it found to be
inadequate mental health facilities provided by the State of Alabama, invoked the due
process clause to impose certain minimum standards on the state. The court ordered
that the number of patients in a multi-patient room not exceed six persons; that
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to effect the SAP are primarily conceptual. Tax realignment in Texas,
as opposed to the states in the East and the Far West, would not be
significant. 23 0 The primary difficulty with moving in this direction
would be the development of planning bodies at the state level to
provide social programs with spillover to all residents of the state
on a rational and efficient basis. This would not seem to impose
insuperable problems.
These conceptual changes, centering on state, instead of local, responsibility for a variety of social services, would not only offer a
rational approach to equal protection problems, but would offer policy
advantages as well. There is no question but that the present approach,
in which localities retain a large share of the responsibility for providing
statewide services has failed. Something will have to be done.23 ' To
date, revenue sharing has emerged as the primary device to ameliorate
there be a minimum of 80 square feet of floor space per patient in a multi-patient
room; that there be one toilet provided each eight patients and a lavatory for each
six patients and that the toilets be installed in separate stalls to insure privacy; and
that the diet for the patients provide at a minimum, the recommended daily dietary
allowances as developed by the National Academy of Sciences. Id. at 395-407, App. A.
The court arrived at these standards by consulting independent experts in the field
of mental health and insisted that the Alabama legislature fund its newly mandated
program. Id. at 393-94. If a court can undertake a task such as this, certainly it
can work with the three categories suggested in this study.
230. The primary effect arising from utilization of this new approach in Texas,
with its increased reliance on user charges to finance private services, would be
curtailment of property tax, or any local tax, subsidies to various utilities, sanitation,
and transportation programs. While tax realignment would not be significant in
terms of absolute tax dollars, implementation of the SAP would affect the bond
issues of many municipalities and special districts; revenue bonds would have to be
substituted for general obligation bonds whenever an instrumentality might seek to
finance private services. For a discussion of the distinguishing aspects of revenue
bonds, see INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGERS ASSOCIATION, TECHNIQUE OF MUNICIPAL
ADMINISTRATION (4th ed. 1958).
231. A variety of options exists for providing social services with spillover effect
uniformly throughout the state. Private services may also be subsidized, or in effect
be converted to a social service under the SAP as long as the subsidization is undertaken on a rational basis. To illustrate, aid to the needy, aid to citizens in either
sparsely or densely populated areas, and aid to the mentally and physically handicapped
all constitute rational class distinctions for public subsidies. But aid to any of these
classes only if they happen to live in a wealthy district, or denial if they happen to
live in a poor district, is irrational.
Using public hospitals as an example, a state should be permitted to act if
a need exists to provide such free health services to the needy. Several preferable
alternatives to locally financed hospital districts should be explored. For instance, the
state itself could fund a program of state hospitals throughout the entire state. Or,
several free market-type solutions, based upon Professor Friedman's education voucher
scheme could be utilized. See Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in
ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (R. Solo ed. 1955). Under this approach, the
state could grant vouchers to all families with an annual income below a fixed figure
to be used for the sole purpose of defraying health costs, Such a program also has
policy advantages in that it would avoid the bureaucratic nightmare of creating another massive state agency. Under such alternatives, aid would be given the needy
in all areas of the state on a uniform basis and not just to the "lucky" needy in
certain isolated subdivisions that have, for one reason or another, perceived a need.
The only limitation on legislative discretion should be the rational basis test, by
which all citizens within a given class, not simply those within a given district, have
equal access to any social-spillover programs that exist within the state.
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community wealth disparities with regard to statewide social services.
It should be emphasized, however, that revenue sharing can only reduce
the impact of wealth disparities, not eliminate them as would the SAP.
To illustrate this point, neither of the approaches to revenue
sharing232 offered, as does the SAP, a reallocation of governmental
responsibility for providing various services. 33 Rather, the revenuesharing measures only direct a portion of the federal income tax base
to existing governmental structures, thus permitting localities to in35
crease services or reduce taxes.2 34 A recent case, Mathews v. Massell,
points out some problems with permitting localities to choose, from
a list of priority items, which services they want and how much they
232. Two versions of revenue sharing were offered to the Congress. In 1971

the Administration offered its approach. H.R. Doc. 92-47, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971)
(hereinafter cited as the Administration bill]. In 1972, Wilbur Mills, Chairman of the
House Ways and Means Committee, responded by offering his own bill. H.R. 14370,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited as the Mills bill]. In order to illustrate
their different underlying theories, both bills are discussed, even though the
adopted program more nearly resembles the Mills bill. See State and Local Fiscal
Assistance Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-512, 86 Stat. 919 [hereinafter cited as Pub. L.

No. 92-5121.

233. The Administration bill did not attempt to set priorities for local-government
expenditure of shared funds, but instead provided a general grant to all political
subdivisions to spend as they might choose. The Mills bill, however, set forth
priorities which financially encouraged localities to undertake certain tasks with
shared funds. As finally enacted, these priorities included:
(1) ordinary and necessary maintenance and operating expenses for
(A) public safety (including law enforcement, fire protection and building
code enforcement),
(B) environmental protection (including sewage disposal, sanitation, and
pollution abatement),
(C) public transportation (including transit systems and streets and roads),
(D) health,
(E) recreation,
(F) libraries,
(G) social services for the poor or aged, and
(H) financial administration, and
(2) ordinary and necessary capital expenditures authorized by law.
Pub. L. No. 92-512, § 1222(a). Thus, under the act as passed on October 20, 1972,
local governments may continue to subsidize private services and provide social
services with spillover effect. In fact, in view of the formulae for determining federal
fund entitlements (see note 234 infra), governments are encouraged to increase their
tax efforts to obtain more federal money. As a result, existing imbalances in service
and tax levels will persist.
234. Property tax reduction is not the prime thrust of revenue sharing. While
no enforcement machinery exists under revenue-sharing legislation to prevent states
and localities from using federal funds to replace local taxes, if states and localities
do reduce their taxes, they would eventually be penalized for doing so. See note 236
infra. General tax effort" (see Pub. L. No. 92-512, § 1228(c)), plays a significant role
in determining how much each state government (see id. § 1225) and each political subdivision within each state (see id. § 1227) receives in federal funds. In this respect,
federal revenue-sharing formulae are designed to reward intense tax effort. Thus, if a
city or state takes federal money and uses it to replace local money, thereby permitting
a tax reduction, that same unit of government will, in the future, receive proportionately
less funds than those governments that increase service levels and maintain intense
tax effort.
Although an initial justification for revenue sharing was to create a means
for the federal government to direct resources to local governments so that they
might undertake new services and expand old ones, final legislation, however, did not
include machinery to guarantee that this goal would be accomplished.
235. Civil No. 17,814 (N.D. Ga., filed March 15, 1973).
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are willing to pay for them. In Massell, the City of Atlanta spend
$4.5 million of federal revenue sharing funds on firemen's salaries, a
priority item. At the same time, however, the City reduced the local
input by a correlative amount and applied that amount to its water
system, thereby permitting a $4.5 million water rate reduction.
Plaintiffs then successfully brought a class action to enjoin Atlanta
from implementing the scheme to use revenue-sharing funds to reduce
water rates rather than provide new and expanded social services.
The court held that Atlanta's action constituted a "sham" and enjoined
its use of the $4.5 million local fund offset on a nonpriority item. 6
Beyond the issue of who should decide how Atlanta spends its tax
dollars, the fact pattern reveals certain basic flaws in the present
system of revenue sharing by which federal money is funneled directly
to political subdivisions.
In this respect, existing methods of public finance, by which the
political subdivisions of a state are often permitted to subsidize private
services and are more frequently required to finance certain social
services with significant spillover, result, as has been shown, in disparate service levels unrelated to need. Adding an increment of federal
revenue-sharing funds to these existing disparities can only exacerbate
the mismatching of needs and resources. From a policy viewpoint,
since federal revenue-sharing funds are scarce, they should be directed
to the area of greatest need, both in programatic and geographic terms,
Since the present method of revenue sharing offers additional funds
to wealthy subdivisions as well as poor subdivisions, to be devoted
to any or all of the full range of priority items, this increment permits
the wealthy districts to purchase frills, while the poor district may still
be unable to meet basic community needs. Thus, while an Atlanta
may reduce its water rates below cost and thereby grant a form of
welfare-in-kind to its residents who are users of water, citizens in
other areas of Georgia, who may be in as much need 2 7 of inexpensive
water as those in Atlanta, cannot have it. The current approach to
revenue sharing, while alleviating future pressure on local tax bases,
236. Id. By invoking Pub. L. No. 92-512, § 1222(a) as a substantive constraint
on local fiscal decisions, the court ignored the Senate Finance Committee's policy
warning:
[S]ince the local governments are not required to maintain the level of their
own prior expenditures in the high priority items . . . they could arrange to
use the aid funds to increase their spending for other than high priority items.
As a result, provision for the high priority categories, at best, is illusory.
S. REP. No. 92-1050, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1972). By reading a substantive requirement into this section, the court has involved the judiciary in local decision
making processes relating to purely local concerns. Also, while Atlanta attempted
to subsidize water rates, a nonpriority item, there is no practical difference between
that and subsidizing public transportation, a priority item; tax dollars from all over
the country are used to reduce the rates of a local service.
237. See note 207 supra.
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would not eliminate service and tax disparities for social services
with significant spillover. Needs and resources would continue to be
mismatched. Localities would continue to decide the level and quality
of social services with statewide impact with the inevitable result of
continued disparities arising from local wealth differentials.238 In
short, this overlay of federal aid on existing state-local relationships
will only lessen for a time growing local tax pressures and will not in
any way balance needs with resources.
An increased role for the state, particularly in the revenue raising
and the planning phases, is the cornerstone of this Article's theme.
The critical relationship is between the states and the federal government, and not that between the federal government and the political
subdivisions of the states. Efforts on the part of the federal government
to power equalize the thousands of political subdivisions through the
infusion of revenue-sharing funds are apt to prove as futile as have
state efforts at equalization of local property taxes to support education.
Rather, in keeping with the overall federal scheme of government,
the state should be the political entity to determine needs and allocate
resources in coping with social services with significant spillover effect.
Revenue sharing, then, should be confined to the state-federal relationship. The net effect of this approach would be a decreased policymaking role for the federal government, and an increased role for the
states. Local governments should be left relatively autonomous with
respect to the funding and administering of social services without
significant spillover.

Finally, it should be emphasized that this increased role need not
threaten traditional concepts of local control of many government
services. First, having limited the local property tax to financing local
social services, localities will be allowed to tax as they please without
outside interference. Secondly, although the state must fund education
238. This issue is the crux of the SAP: social services with significant spillover

must not be enriched at the local level. It is not possible to leave these kinds of
services to localities or to permit them to define their own needs. Inevitably, regardless of the formula utilized, interdistrict disparities will arise depending on the relative
wealth of the political subdivisions. The only means of eliminating these disparities
depends upon implementation of the social equity approach (see text accompanying
note 27 supra), by which local jurisdictions are forbidden from determining how much
of these statewide services their own localities are to receive.
Permitting localities to subsidize private services has, in fact, already resulted
in the waste of scarce resources. It has been shown that certain "wealthy" communities have used revenue-sharing funds to build ice rinks and bathhouses, to buy band
uniforms and instruments, to remodel municipal golf courses, and to build municipal
stadiums. Phila. Inquirer, Apr. 1, 1973, at 10-A, col. 1. These expenditures, seemingly on low-priority items, should be considered as direct costs against other
high-priority expenditures. For example, all potholes in all city streets should be
filled before incremental federal funds are used to subsidize golf courses. So long as
federal revenue-sharing efforts fail to recognize this effect and fail to implement some
variation of the social equity approach, the service disparity problem will persist.
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and welfare, states may appropriately delegate much administrative
decision making and allocation of priorities to the localities themselves.
This need to preserve local discretion should, in fact, preoccupy policymakers in their application of the social equity approach to revenue
redistribution.
V.

SOME

CONCLUDING

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

It should be emphasized that the twin problems of service disparities and tax inequity are not solely the result of the property tax.
These problems would persist, though in a slightly modified form,
in the event either sales or income taxes were substituted for the
present uses of the property tax. The problem is, in short, definition
of which services are appropriately supported by a local tax base, and
which ought to be supported by a state tax base. Therefore, the SAP
focuses not on which tax base is used, but instead on how a given
tax base is used. Its purpose is to match needs and resources and
thereby eliminate waste and inefficiency. By making the financing of
particular services co-extensive with their economic impact, waste and
inequity can be significantly reduced.
Beyond the legal arguments concerning the use of the SAP, certain policy considerations involving continued use of the property
tax are also relevant. Under the SAP, property taxation is only
proper as long as service disparities among the various taxing jurisdictions are eliminated. Where a service must be provided equally
statewide, the state should affirmatively equalize fiscal resources among
the various subdivisions. This state responsibility, coupled with the
Weissinger v. Boswell. 9 opinion - calling for standardized assessment ratios guaranteed by the state - would require a new state
presence and a new kind of uniform property tax. 240 This new courtcompelled property tax appears, however, to apply only to statewide
services, and not necessarily to municipalities concerned with local
239. 330 F. Supp. 615 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
240. This state presence could appear in any of a variety of forms. The state itself
could centralize property tax assessment and collection in a single state agency with
branch offices directly responsible to this central office. At the other extreme, the
state could merely grant to some central office the power to oversee local administra-

tion of tax assessment and collection. Under the latter approach, the state would only

intervene in local tax administration to correct serious abuses.
However, the courts are likely to be confronted by tax administration
mechanisms designed to preserve local control and, therefore, create imbalances in
assessment and collection procedures. Under the best of conditions, a 20 per cent
variation in assessment is likely to exist between two properties of equal market value.
D. NETZER, supra note 84, at 177-83. The less rigid the administration, or the
greater local control of the state tax base, the greater the disparity among properties of equal value. However, guaranteeing enforcement of standardized state
appraisal procedures would require the creation of an entirely new assessment and
collection apparatus. Thus, the extent of reform in this area is likely to be determined by the courts' willingness to insist upon the creation of a system of tax administration geared to achieve "real" standardization.
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needs. Under Boswell, twin property tax bases may continue to coexist. Local tax bases assessed at different ratios from other localities,
but standardized within the particular subdivision, apparently do not
violate the Constitution unless they are used to support a service which
must be provided equally throughout the state.
Sound policy reasons counsel against use of a statewide property
tax to finance statewide services. Although such a device may be
necessary in the short term because of the difficulty of replacing existing
property tax revenue with revenue of another sort, use of a statewide
property tax should be viewed as only a transitional tax, ameliorating
the effect of movement to total, nonproperty tax financing of statewide
services. Among the problems involved, a statewide property tax
would likely be unmanageable. A more important policy reason, however, is that use by the state of this tax base threatens its preemption
from local use. The factors of tax incidence2 4' - extent of shifting
and exportation potential - establish very real, though intangible,
constraints on how much property taxpayers in various political subdivisions throughout the state can or will pay. If the state preempts a
sizeable portion of available property tax dollars, then local governments will suffer to the extent that they will be unable to raise sufficient
revenue to meet their needs. The effect of a statewide property tax
would be to pit the cities against the state in competition for scarce
property tax dollars.
Since the underlying theory of the SAP is that the governmental
unit bearing the economic impact of a service ought to manage and
finance it, the spirit, if not the letter, of the SAP is violated by state
preemption of the property tax base. Guaranteeing equalization at the
state level of one social service, at the expense of denying an opportunity for localities to fund local social services according to need,
is not an acceptable trade-off. As the inability of a number of localities
to meet their local needs becomes apparent and political pressures
for relief grow, some form of revenue sharing will, quite likely, be
utilized by the state to appease the cities. Such a program will only
result in subsidization of purely local services in such a way as to
preclude a genuine definition of local needs.
Finally, problems involving the property tax and service disparities are similar in origin. One set of problems cannot be solved
without solving the other. The difficult solution seems to require
elimination or, at least, substantial reduction of the spillover of benefits
and the uneven burden of taxes among the various political subdivisions
241. See notes 75-82 and accompanying text supra.
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of the state. Once achieved through utilization of the SAP, the
optimum role of the property tax in public finance can be put into
perspective.
The property tax should be retained as the mainstay of local
finance,2 42 but only for financing local social services, those with no
significant spillover effect. The property tax should not be used to
finance either social services with significant spillover or private
services. Local services may be financed, under the SAP, through the
use of any tax base - property, sales, or income.
The strongest rationale for continued use of the property tax by
local government centers upon the interrelationship between property
owners, property, and local social services. Local social services, such
as fire and police protection, are identified with the value of property
and, therefore, the interests of property owners.24 The level of each
of these services contributes to property values in a more direct and
immediate way than the level of these services affects either local income
or sales. Property taxpayer-voters, then, may be more willing to pay
for quality local services than would either income taxpayer-voters
or sales taxpayer-voters. In fact, using the property tax as the prime
support for these services gives property taxpayers a vested interest
in maintaining quality public services. Furthermore, in a broad sense,
these services are incidents of rent, or the total cost of all elements
necessary for the use, enjoyment, and appreciation of property.244
Other policy justifications for continued use of the property tax
include its ease of manageability by local governments. From an
administrative standpoint, local governments already have machinery
in existence to raise revenue from this tax source, whereas none exists
242. Professor Benson justifies continued intensive use of the property tax
because it is uniquely suited to administration at the local level and provides a means
to insure local independence and decentralization of government. See G. BENSON,
THE AMERICAN PROPERTY TAX: ITS HISTORY, ADMINISTRATION, AND ECONOMIC
IMPACT 1-10 (1965).
243. See notes 47-51 and accompanying text supra.
244. Site valuation would appear to be preferable to the present method of assessment by which improvements are assessed along with the value of the land itself.
The new suggested role for the property tax envisions it more as an additional
expense on the part of land owners to defray the cost of running certain local social
programs necessary for the use and enjoyment of property than as a revenue source
for redistributing income through a variety of social programs unrelated to property
ownership. When viewed as such, a tax on the land itself, appears appropriate. For
a thorough discussion of this as well as other aspects of site evaluation, see D. NETZER,
supra note 84, at 197-212.
Another aspect of the advantage of assessing on the basis of site value is the
manageability of this alternative as compared with the present system. Id. at 198-202.
Rather than determining both the locational value of the land and the value of the
improvements, only the first element need be considered. Moreover, while fluctuation
does exist in the site value of land, such fluctuation is not as extreme as that of
improvements. Thus, without discussing the economic effects of this theory of assessment, site valuation appears peculiarly suited to the new role for the property tax
under the SAP See also F. MICHELMAN & I. SANDALOW, supra note 35, at 511-16.
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for utilizing either sales or income taxes. There are, in short, no
policy reasons against continued property taxation for predominantly
local services, and several sound policy reasons for its continued use.
The suggested method of financing services and establishing tax
equity as expressed in this Article is not novel. While the SAP is
novel to the extent of its use as a legal doctrine, it is but an expression,
in large part, of many of the policy views of the Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations appearing in its study of State Aid
to Local Government.2 4 This analysis offers an alternative to the
evolving legal and political approaches, as represented by the fundamental interest doctrine and revenue sharing, for solving intergovernmental financial problems. Hopefully, the SAP will contribute to the
reworking, or at least refining of existing efforts to cope with modern
problems of public finance.
245. See notes 4, 26 & 91-92 supra.
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